International Seminar on Peace & Conflict Resolution
23-24 October 2013

Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS)
NUST Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (NIPCONS)
National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST)
FOREWORD

The International Seminar on Peace and Conflict Resolution was held at the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) in Islamabad from 23 to 24 October 2013. The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Mr Mamnoon Hussain, inaugurated the Seminar. Prominent dignitaries at the inaugural session included Mr Timo Pakkala, the UN Resident Coordinator in Pakistan and the Minister for Science and Technology Mr Zahid Hamid.

The seminar was organized to highlight the issues affecting international and regional peace and stability. The aim was to provide a forum for discussing innovative ideas and approaches regarding peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

In the technical sessions eminent scholars, veteran peacekeepers and experts on peace and conflict resolution presented their papers. The speakers represented reputed organizations and agencies like the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana; Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden; United Service Institution (USI) of India; the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Hawaii; and the George Mason University (GMU), Washington DC. Foreign delegates also included representatives of the Birendra Peace Keeping Operation Training Centre, Nepal; Cairo Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping; and Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre.

The foreign speakers included Dr Edward Rhodes, Dr Sara Cobb and Dr Allison Frendak-Blume from GMU, Dr Saira Yamin from APCSS, Lt Gen (Retd) R K Mehta of USI India, Mr. Jonas Alberoth (Folke Bernadotte Academy) Sweden, and Mr Fiifi Edu Afful (KAIPTC).

The Pakistani speakers included former Special Representative of the Secretary General to Rwanda Ambassador Shahnayar M. Khan, former UN peacekeepers and UN officials like Lieutenant General (retired) Tariq Waseem Ghazi, Lieutenant General (retired) Sikandar Afzal, Major General (retired) Anis Ahmed Bajwa and Brigadier (retired) Mujahid Alam. Former interim law minister Ahmer Bilal Soofi spoke on international laws and its relevance to peacekeeping operations. A large number of researchers and scholars from local universities and think tanks attended the proceedings.

On both days of the Seminar, a variety of issues were debated upon through the presentations of scholarly papers and discussions. Particular emphasis was placed on the challenges facing global peace and security, such as terrorism, and Peacekeeping Operations. Some very important lessons gleaned from the discussion have been shared in the final chapter of the compendium.

Putting together of this compendium was a team effort. We first thank the authors for providing their papers. We hope that readers of this compendium would find the papers interesting and thought provoking. It is important to mention that, the publication of compendium also marks the first anniversary of CIPS.

We are indebted to Rector NUST, Engineer Muhammad Asghar, for wholeheartedly backing this international seminar. The organization of an event of this scale would have not been possible without the untiring professional support of Administration, Q&A, ICT, Publishing, and HR Directorates. We would be remiss if we do not acknowledge the hard work of Dr Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Mr Naeem Akbar in coordinating the various aspects of the Seminar and to Dr Rizwan Naseer for putting this compendium together.

We look forward to organizing more of such events for encouraging dialogue on important issues of peace and stability with a global focus.

Mr Ali Baz          Dr Tughral Yamin
Principal NIPCONS            Associate Dean CIPS

Dated: 1 March 2014, Islamabad
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DAY I
Inaugural Session
OPENING REMARKS

ENGINEER MUHAMMAD ASGHAR, RECTOR NUST

Honourable President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Mr Mamnoon Hussain; Excellency Timo Pakkala, UN Resident Coordinator in Pakistan; Federal Minister for Science & Technology, Mr Zahid Hamid Mr Ali Baz, Principal NUST Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies; Distinguished Guests, Members of Faculty, Students, Ladies & Gentlemen Assalam-o-Alaikum & Good Morning

It is my privilege and pleasure to welcome you to this groundbreaking seminar of our newly established Centre for International Peace and Stability. We are especially grateful to the chief guest, our foreign guests and Pakistanis who have come from outside Islamabad. We are lucky to have a pleasant weather here and I am sure you will have an enjoyable stay in Islamabad.

We are living through historic times. We saw the end of the Cold War and the era of Unipolar World, that is now giving way to a multi-centric world. A major part of the global South is undergoing transformation that the UN Human Development Report 2013 terms as “Rise of the South”. But we also see many countries experiencing turmoil and social conflict.

According to a Development Policy Management Forum Paper:
“During the four decades between the 1960s and the 1990s, there have been about 80 violent changes of Governments in Sub-Saharan African countries, during which these countries experienced different types of civil strife, conflicts and wars. At the beginning of new millennium, there were 18 countries facing armed rebellion, 11 facing severe political crises, and 19 enjoying more or less stable political condition”.

A US State Department report says that there are at least 8 million weapons in West Africa, with more than half in the hands of insurgents and criminals. African Continent is the one that drew maximum UN Peacekeeping effort. However, it is the Greater Middle East and South Asia that have seen major wars and widespread turmoil, which is impacting the entire world.

According to a Congressional Research Service Report of March 29, 2011, the cost of Global War on Terror by the US till 2012 is about 1.4 Trillion dollars. Other sources like the Brown University estimates are much higher. A RAND Study says that a non-military option by the US to 9/11 attacks would have cost the US much less than what they have actually spent. The study made a systematic examination and comparison of 268 groups using terror tactics in the period 1968 – 2006. It showed that several alternatives to military response had been more effective in eliminating future attacks. The study found that 40% of the 268 groups were eliminated through intelligence and policing methods; 43% ended violence as a result of political accommodation; 10% ended violence after achieving victory and only 7% were defeated militarily.

This shows that there exists significant space for peace and conflict resolution strategy, provided the peace-making effort takes into account the ground realities, socio-economic imperatives and cultural sensitivities of the people involved in the conflict.

UN HDR 2013 draws our attention to some of the future possible sources of instability that are environmental degradation, climate change, natural disasters, changing migration patterns, trade disparities, governance, non-sustainable development. Hence, the future conflicts or social upheavals are likely to be of different nature and they will require comprehensive response by not only the individual states but also the entire global community. This means that instead of GDP as a measure of growth we seriously consider the new concept of genuine progress indicator that accounts for disparities in the distribution of income, wealth and opportunities + the costs of environment degradation, crime family stress, unemployment, poor health etc, where the germs of conflict and instability + violence lie.

We hope to listen to quality papers covering not only the experience, but also projection into the future prospects of peace and conflict resolution. We are lucky to have academicians, ambassadors, experts in international law and senior military officers with a lot of experience and insight into peacekeeping operations. I am sure our faculty and students will benefit immensely from them.

I once again thank all our guests and especially the honourable President of Pakistan for his presence among us.

I thank you all, Ladies and Gentlemen.
SPEECH BY THE CHIEF GUEST

H.E. MAMNOON HUSSAIN, THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN

Dear Students,
Ladies and Gentlemen!

Please accept my gratitude for inviting me to the International Seminar on Peace and Conflict resolution as the chief guest. It is indeed a matter of singular honour for me to be among the galaxy of national and international scholars of peace and conflict resolution. I am grateful to the delegates who have travelled all the way from different parts of the world to participate in this seminar. I hope your stay at Islamabad proves to be enjoyable and rewarding.

It was a much needed seminar in the perspective of security situation that our motherland is facing. We are faced with a nameless, faceless, stateless enemy determined to destabilize our country politically, economically and militarily. The enemy is determined to influence the events in the region and wants to occupy the driving seat. Unstable Pakistan suits the ambitions of the invisible stakeholder. Flight of capital, ambition to control our nuclear assets, weaken our institutions, control our economy and the sea-lanes is its desire.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Pakistan is faced with numerous problems due to the mischief of this enemy but the good thing is that we are aware now more than ever before of the designs of our foes. Our invisible enemy has done us tremendous damage over the decades. A covert enemy is many times more dangerous than the overt one, and we have to be wary of both. The covert enemy is extremely smart, intelligent, resourceful and influential. It leaves no traces behind. All the traces lead to our own people. The faces, language and the techniques are indigenous. Only the agenda is foreign. The friendly enemy provides mission, technical and financial assistance. If the invisible hand stops interfering in our part of the world, we will have instant peace and stability over here. Our cricket stadiums will also be hosting Australian and British teams. Foreign investors would compete for investment in this country. Energy crisis can be overcome and the industry can be rebuilt. But all this will be possible when security situation improves.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Our culture and religion are both targeted viciously. Mosques, schools, libraries and business centres are being attacked regularly. It is an attempt to cripple our economy, psyche and morale. No doubt, the challenge is massive, yet so is our resolve to bear it with fortitude and patience. Despite odds we not unnerved and beg for Allah's Mercy and help. Allah's help can save us, make us steadfast in this hour of trial. We need to keep our nerves. It is the test of our national integration and depth as a Muslim State. If we stand this test the enemy will shatter otherwise we will diminish. Stakes are high for the enemy as well as us. We must bear it with patience. This state has already touched its lowest ebb. Now is the time to emerge out of this pit.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Our hostile neighbours are also watching and actively following the political and security developments in Pakistan. Our Message to our neighbours is that unstable Pakistan is in nobody's interest. United we stand, divided we fall. If Pakistan sinks, it will not sink alone. Then we will sink together, we and our neighbours in each other's embrace. Lives of a billion + people of the region are at stake. My appeal to our neighbours and the friends is that 'LIVE AND LET LIVE'. If we perish, you will perish with us. We are your neighbours and nobody can change the neighbours. What the West has learnt after 200 years of wars is 'cooperation instead of competition'. With neighbours, friendly relations are always a better and mutually beneficial choice. It is a win-win situation for all. There are no losers and all are gainers. That will be a more advisable course for all. If our neighbours force us to the path of conflict, then we have no choice but to respond and respond, we will Inshallah with all sinews of war as ordained by Almighty Allah. If our neighbours opt for peace, they will find us cooperative and forthcoming. Let us make our region the abode of peace, prosperity and well-being.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I do hope this two-day conference will analyse and discuss the security challenges facing Pakistan in entirely. I would be waiting for the outcomes and recommendations of this direly important seminar. In the end, I once again thank all the delegates for their participation in this important event. I hope you return to your homes with good memories of your visit to Pakistan. I also congratulate Rector NUST and organizers of this seminar for holding this seminar at CIPS. Have a good day. Thank you very much.

Pakistan Paindabad!
International Seminar on Peace & Conflict Resolution, October 2013

REMARKS BY THE GUEST OF HONOUR

MR TIMO PAKKALA, UN RESIDENT COORDINATOR, PAKISTAN

Excellency (The President Islamic Republic of Pakistan), Excellencies, Ambassadors, Engineer Muhammad Ashgar, Rector of the National University of Sciences and Technology, Ladies and gentlemen.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, a group of nations committed to work together to ensure global sustainable peace and security, as well as to promote social progress, better standards of living and human rights. The United Nations was the vehicle established to achieve these aims.

Already in the Preamble of the UN Charter, the founding document of the United Nations, it is clearly stated that the purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security, and to put in place measures for the prevention of conflict. The United Nations was established as the forum to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Pakistan has made, and continues to make, a considerable contribution to supporting the attainment of global peace. Over 8,000 Pakistani peacekeepers are serving in some of the world’s complex environments from Sudan to Haiti to Liberia. In the Ivory Coast, United Nations troops from more than 50 countries are led by the Pakistani Force Commander, General Iqbal Asi. Lieutenant General Maqsood Ahmed also from Pakistan is Senior Military Advisor to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Furthermore, the commitment of the Pakistani people to international peace has been articulated in the establishment of the very institute where we find ourselves today, the Centre of International Peace and Stability, which was inaugurated by the UN Secretary General in August this year.

Since its inception, the United Nations in Pakistan has been collaborating closely with the Centre of International Peace and Stability in preparing Pakistani peacekeepers for deployment. UN Agencies such as OCHA, UNHCR and UN Women, amongst others, are engaged in training peacekeepers on issues such as refugees and internally displaced persons, humanitarian coordination and gender.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Attainment of peace is the very essence of the work of the United Nations, together with its member states. This is most clearly highlighted by the 1984 General Assembly Resolution recognizing that all peoples have a sacred right to peace.

I congratulate the National University of Sciences and Technology and the Centre for International Peace and Stability for organizing this important event and look forward to very productive deliberations.

Thank you
DAY I
MORNING SESSION
Theme: Regional Peace with Focus on South Asia
I am greatly honoured to have this opportunity to speak about conflict resolution by the United Nations at this important event and among such distinguished guests.

The United Nations Charter places international peace and security at the core of the Organization. The United Nations, in collaboration with international partners, uses a variety of approaches, tools and mechanisms to pursue peace and stability. This includes Peace Operations, Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Building. I will briefly touch upon each of these three approaches.

Peace Operations. Both peacekeeping and political missions are present on the ground under a Chapter VI, Chapter VII or Chapter VIII mandate, whereas political missions are civilian in character. With over 110,000 personnel serving in around 30 peacekeeping and political missions in 2012, these are also amongst the most visible undertakings of the organization. As peace operations continue to evolve encompassing larger and more complex mandates, the United Nations, working in close partnerships with Member States, regional organizations, national authorities and other stakeholders, strives to adapt its peacekeeping and peacemaking tools to address new, ever-growing challenges and additional demands. This very Centre for International Peace and Stability is an excellent example of increased focus on training to prepare peacekeepers for new challenges.

As every UN peace operation has been established in order to respond to a unique situation and environment, these operations are diverse in nature. Activities vital to maintaining international peace and security include monitoring ceasefires; stabilizing post-conflict environments; disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life; strengthening governance and rule of law, promoting dialogue and reconciliation; protecting civilians and helping to facilitate the democratic process.

In recognition of the security-development nexus, most UN peace operations around the world are now integrated UN missions. Integrated missions ensure that the entire UN system, humanitarian and development agencies, work together with the political and/or military missions in order to consolidate peace and security while strengthening progress towards socio-economic development goals.

Preventive diplomacy is perhaps one of the most well-known functions of the United Nations. After all, this organization was founded on the promise to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. When we talk of preventive diplomacy, we refer to diplomatic action taken to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur.

The UN Secretary-General has made it a priority to re-energize the United Nations' preventive diplomacy, to improve our machinery and expand our partnerships. According to the World Bank, the cost of civil war can be equivalent to more than 30 years of economic growth. By contrast, in the face of political tensions or escalating crisis, preventive diplomacy is often one of the few options available, short of coercive measures, to preserve peace. Successful engagements can stop crises before they spread, reducing the impact and burden of conflict.

Within the United Nations, a key development has been the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the establishment within this Department of a Mediation Support Unit that provides expertise to envoys engaging in negotiations. The increased deployment of political missions by the United Nations and other organizations also provides a stronger platform for preventive diplomacy.

Preventive diplomacy involves the timely use of diplomatic action to prevent the outbreak and spread of hostilities. Supported by the Department of Political Affairs, the Secretary-General provides his “good offices” to parties in conflict both personally and through the diplomatic envoys he dispatches to areas of tension around the world. Many political missions fall under this umbrella, including regional offices covering Central Africa, West Africa and Central Asia – such as the UN Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia based in Turkmenistan. They have explicit mandates for preventive diplomacy and strengthening the capacity of states and regional actors to manage sources of conflict.

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1 Chapter VI, UN Charter – gives UN troops a mandate to defend themselves and the area they are in charge of, but in principle without lethal force.
Chapter VII, UN Charter – gives UN troops the mandate to use lethal force.
Chapter VII provides for the involvement of regional arrangements/agencies.
of tension peacefully. Preventive diplomacy is also carried out frequently within the context of peacekeeping missions.

The Security Council as the UN organ with the primary responsibility for peace and security also has a critical role to play in supporting preventive action. Recent years have seen increased Council engagement and flexibility in addressing emerging threats before they come on the Council’s formal agenda. Through its actions, the Council can send important signals that help discourage violence and open space for preventive action including by the Secretary-General.

The increased focus of the United Nations on peace building is an acknowledgement that sustainable peace can only be achieved by addressing the complex challenges that countries face during recovery from conflict. These range from responding to humanitarian needs to supporting the rebuilding of national security forces to economic growth.

To promote sustainable peace, peace building involves Secretary-General’s envoys and representatives, political and peacekeeping missions as well as the UN agencies, funds and programmes, whose efforts deliver peace dividends, support recovery and kick-start development.

In his 2009 report on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the Secretary-General identified the first two years after the end of conflict as the key window of opportunity to begin building sustainable peace. He also laid out an agenda for action to support improved response by the United Nations system during this period.

The United Nations has made significant progress in advancing this agenda. United Nations missions and country teams are working more closely together, through the mechanism of integrated mission. The United Nations has also become more agile in deploying senior leaders, specialized experts and staff to the field. We have strengthened and expanded our partnerships, including closer collaboration with organs such as the World Bank and regional organizations, and we are broadening and deepening the pool of institution-building expertise in key capacity gap areas.

Experience has revealed three elements that are critical to preventing relapse and producing more resilient states and societies: inclusivity, institution-building, and sustained international support—these are the basic tenants of UN development programming. Inclusive, good governance and rule of law, as well as effective, transparent, accountable and democratic institutions are critical for sustainable development. Similarly, there is a vital need for an early focus on restoring core administrative and financial management systems, and on delivering social services.

Finally, we cannot have a comprehensive discussion on conflict resolution without recognizing the critical role played by women and girls in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Ensuring women’s participation in peace building is not only a matter of women’s and girls’ rights. Women are crucial partners in shoring up the three pillars of lasting peace: economic recovery, social cohesion and political legitimacy.

Peacebuilders must address all forms of injustice, including gender inequality and discrimination on the basis of sex. This requires recognition of the new roles that women often assume during conflict—as combatants, economic actors providing for their families or activists engaged in community reconciliation. In the aftermath of conflict, national and international actors must ensure that international human rights standards are upheld, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which reaffirms women’s full entitlement to all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

Underlining the importance of considering women and girls in peace, the Security Council adopted resolution 2122 on 18 October. It calls for increased and more regular reporting on issues relevant to women, peace and security.

Striving for peace and upholding the United Nations Charter is the responsibly of all peoples and nations. The Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), inaugurated by the United Nations Secretary-General on 13 August this year, and holding of this event here today, demonstrate the continued commitment of the people of Pakistan to international peace and security. Thank you very much.
Writing in 1989, American social scientist Francis Fukuyama developed the idea of a forthcoming “end of history” – not a cataclysmic event, but a triumph of liberal values and institutions, a final and complete victory of the idea of natural rights to life, liberty, and property, and of the notion that governance exists by social contract to protect these rights. Though careful to acknowledge the possibility of retrograde and anachronistic events, Fukuyama posited that with decay of communism there existed no plausible ideological challenge to this liberal view of politics, and suggested the emergence of a world order based on shared liberal principles.1

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the definitive end of the Cold War, American administrations began to wrestle with what an “end of history” might mean for American foreign policy. One view, of course, was that there would be no “end of history,” that the world would continue much as it had for the past three and a half centuries, with sovereign states vying for supremacy, power, or security under conditions of anarchy.

A second view was that while there would be no “end of history” the parameters of global struggle and competition were indeed changing. The most prominent exponent of such a view was perhaps the late Samuel Hun-

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3 See, for example, Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000.
For President Bush, the fact that there was a single, surviving “model of human progress” meant that “We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.” In other words, President Bush argued, the world could move beyond the anarchy, self-help, and balance-of-power kinds of politics that the Westphalian system had implied. Instead a new, peaceful world order could emerge, a world in which individuals would be free to enjoy their natural birthright of life, liberty, and property without fear of government interference or international conflict. “Throughout history,” the president asserted, “freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing of wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread disease and poverty. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes.”

While rivalries would still exist between great powers, a liberal world order under the American aegis would mean an end to war. In President Bush’s words, “Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our world is not.”

There is a useful historical context for understanding President Bush’s vision. What President Bush was undertaking was America’s third attempt in a century to create a global, liberal world order – that is, its third attempt to achieve some sort of “end of history.”

The first attempt was that of Woodrow Wilson, during and after World War I – and Bush’s agenda is often described as having been Wilsonian. And this is partially correct. What Wilson envisioned, of course, was a liberal world built on two pillars. The first was the elimination of monarchic and multi-national imperial states, and the creation of a world in which all building blocks were liberal, democratic, nation-states. The second pillar was an institution of universal world governance, a League of Nations, which would collectively ensure or enforce peace and the protection of liberal values and institutions.

The second attempt was that of Franklin Roosevelt during and after World War II. Though the goal was the same, where Roosevelt’s blueprint departed from Wilson’s was that it relied not on the collective will of the world’s states to enforce peace, but on a condominium of four or five great powers to do so. That is, peace would be enforced by four or five great powers working in concert, rather than by the world community as a whole.

The logic of Bush’s vision, of course, differed from that of both Wilson and Roosevelt in a key regard. Rather than being the power of the world community as a whole or the power of a condominium of great states that would ensure peace, it would be the United States acting by itself. In Bush’s words, “the U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.” And he was blunt that “we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.”

American military hegemony, Bush concluded, would create a shield under which liberalism would flourish, and would be the sword that would cut down illiberal forces everywhere in the world. “Today,” the president announced: “the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terror-

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4 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.” Available at http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/bush-graduation-speech-speech-text/. President Bush used very similar language several months later in the opening paragraph of the U.S. National Security Strategy: “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.... People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children – male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.” George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. i. Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.

5 Bush, “West Point.”
7 Bush, “West Point.”
8 Bush, National Security Strategy, p. i.
9 Bush, “West Point.”
ists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists – because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.\(^{10}\)

The sword was as necessary as the shield, in the Bush administration’s thinking, because the world had not quite yet reached “the end of history.” While time and progress were on the side of liberal values and liberal institutions, there were still anachronisms. There were still terrorists and tyrants. And what made these terrorists and tyrants particularly dangerous was that they might acquire weapons of mass destruction, and might engage in actions that would stop the progress of history before history reached the end.

So the Bush administration reckoned that the world needed a few last shoves. President Bush made it clear that it would be U.S. policy to use all of America’s power, including its military power, to remake the world. As the president put it in his preface to the U.S National Security Strategy, “the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe.”\(^{11}\) American military power would need to be used to topple a few tyrants and squash a few terrorists, and this would set a domino process in motion that would get rid of the rest of them. After which, American military hegemony and the existence of peace-loving, effective, sovereign liberal states would preserve a peaceful liberal world.

The second invasion of Iraq was the test-case of the “last shove”.

The Obama administration has not shared this view that a millennium of peaceful, ordered international relations can be created through the application of a modest amount of American military power and the preservation of American military hegemony.

On the one hand, President Obama has rejected the notion that an “end of history” is at hand. The world remains composed of fallen – that is, sinful – individuals and flawed political institutions. We see endemic ethnic violence, sectarianism, insurgencies, and failed states, even in the absence of a universal political philosophy to challenge liberalism in the way that fascism and communism did.

On the other hand, however, President Obama also has rejected the “clash of civilizations” pessimism. He appears to have rejected it on two grounds. First, he argues that, ultimately, civilizational differences are epiphenomenal rather than fundamental. Human rights values are universal, not civilizational. They are simply alternate paths to the same ends. But second, he rejects the notion that difference implies conflict, or at least that it implies uncontrolled conflict.

Perhaps the best place to begin to understand what the Obama administration is up to – to understand how it views the world and what it is trying to achieve – is with President Obama’s Nobel Prize speech, delivered in December 2009.

What President Obama argued was – and I use his words: “I do not bring with me today a definitive solution to the problems of war. … We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetime... There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified. … So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths – that war is sometimes necessary, and war at some level is an expression of human folly. Concretely, we must direct our effort to the task that President Kennedy called for long ago. ‘Let us focus,’ he said, ‘on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions.’ A gradual evolution of human institutions.”\(^{12}\)

Possibly reflecting his own training as a lawyer, in his focus on improved human institutions President Obama argues the case for gradually building a global system of international laws, international norms, and international institutions, with sanctions against those states that break these laws, or violate these norms, or defy these institutions.

The Obama administration’s policy on Syria, which has baffled many observers in the United States and around the world, makes perfect sense in these terms. Unlike his predecessor, President Obama does not see it as a question for the United States to decide whether the Assad regime stays in power or is removed by the Syrian people. This, in his view is fundamentally a matter for the Syrian people. Unlike President Bush, who assumed that with a swift shove the United States, “the end of history” and a millennium of peace might occur, President Obama does not assume that, in general, the form of government of one people is for another people to decide.

But – and this is why he drew a red line at the use of chemical weapons and why he was, to the bafflement of many observers, searching for a punishment that would hurt the Syrian state but would not be or be seen as a tilt toward supporting the insurgents – the use of chemical weapons violated international norms and must be punished in order to uphold the international rule of law. The institutions themselves – institutions like international laws and international treaties – are seen as intrinsically valuable.

Perhaps most interestingly, however, President Obama not only made the case for the expansion of international rules and institutions that would be respected by all, powerful and weak alike, but for rooting much of this in the

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\(^{10}\) Bush, National Security Strategy, pp. i-ii.

\(^{11}\) Bush, National Security Strategy, p. ii.

Just War tradition. In his Nobel speech, President Obama went on to lay out the case for an American foreign policy explicitly based on Western notions of Just War.

The Just War tradition, rooted in the writings of the Christian Church’s St. Augustine, differentiates between the perfect world of god and the imperfect world in which humans live. It develops the argument that while war – because it involves doing violence to another person -- is evil, it may yet be less evil than doing nothing. This Just War tradition was an attack on pacifism, but at the same time an argument against a position of moral neutrality with regard to war or international violence. The essence of the Just War tradition is that in our imperfect world, the protection of innocent life may require us to use violence. If I see an innocent person being attacked, and if I have the capacity to stop that attack, I may face a moral imperative to act, even if this requires me to use violence against the criminal. The Just War tradition wrestles with the problem of defining the conditions under which a recourse to violence is morally justified, and the types of violence that are morally permissible when a just war is being waged.13

For a clear example of what this effort to root U.S. foreign policy in the Just War tradition implies, one need only, look at President Obama’s May 23, 2013 speech on drone policy. In that speech, President Obama carefully justified America’s ongoing war against terrorists not as a war against terrorists or terrorism in general, but a war against a particular adversary – al Qaeda – which had attacked and continued to threaten to attack innocent life in the United States.

Interestingly, in this speech the president sought to make the case that it was through an embrace of Just War’s constraints on the use of force that the United States could design a foreign policy that would both defend America’s values abroad and preserve American liberal democracy at home, protecting American society against militarization and polarization.

“America is at a crossroads,” Obama said.

“We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that “No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do – what we must do – is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend....

“In Afghanistan, we will continue our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force, which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.

“Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless “global war on terror,” but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.”14

The critical point is this: even though some of the actions may look the same or very much alike, the logic and goals of the Bush and Obama administration are fundamentally different. President Bush defined America’s goals as creating a new, peaceful, liberal world order, under America’s military aegis. President Obama has defined America’s goals as stopping attacks on innocent lives in the United States and its allies, in a manner consistent with gradually building international law.

There are three elements in the Obama strategy. The first is to work to build partnership with sovereign states around the world to stamp out or rein in those groups that may be involved with, or sponsoring, terrorist attacks on America.

The second element deals with those places where a sovereign’s rule of law does not effectively extend. In these places – sadly, including areas of Central Asia, East Africa, and the Maghreb -- the United States will itself target those individuals or groups who are planning or preparing terrorist attacks on the United States, and it will do so in the most efficient way possible – using drone strikes. This is seen as the best way to avoid the death of innocents (and the longer-term harm to relations between governments and nations) that would be associated with a more traditional military action, with boots on the ground and automatic rifles blazing. Where the sledgehammer of an invasion by Army or Marine units might fail just in belli’s proportionality tests, which require the damage done in the waging of the war not be disproportionate to the end accomplished, the surgical knife of a drone strike might pass this test, the Obama administration reasons.

What must be emphasized is that the Obama administration views this as preventive action to stop attacks by criminals on innocents and as bringing to justice international lawbreakers who are hiding in places where sovereign authority is unable to bring them to justice.

Here’s how Obama himself put it:

“Despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains. In some of these places – such as parts of Somalia and Yemen – the state only has the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks

13 For a useful introduction to the Just War tradition and its implications for modern politics, see Gordon Graham, Ethics and International Relations, second edition (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2007).

14 Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, 23 May 2013.” Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university
the capacity or will to take action. And it’s also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians – where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with surrounding tribal communities, for example, that pose no threat to us; times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis.”

President Obama proceeded to be explicit about the example foremost in his mind – what particular “terrorist compound” he was thinking of. “To put it another way,” he continued, “our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm.” That operation was enormously difficult and risky, and depended on the infrastructure and capabilities already in-theatre. Even more to the point, “the cost to our relationship with Pakistan – and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory – was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership. So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.”

The third element of Obama’s strategy is positive engagement with the peoples of the world, and in particular the peoples of the Islamic world.

Although the past four years did not move forward as President Obama would have hoped, the key to understanding this third element is to return to a careful reading of President Obama’s June 2009 speech in Cairo. Like the Nobel Prize speech and like the Drone speech it is a fundamental statement of his approach. And the relationship he offered is still on the table. Even after four years, the Obama administration is still hoping for the “new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world” – because the administration correctly sees this new beginning as essential.

In that speech, President Obama made explicit what the United States would offer and what it would expect in a new relationship. The United States was prepared to embrace a world of cultural, civilizational differences. It would not seek to remake the world in the U.S. image. It was prepared to remove military forces from Iraq and “leave Iraq to Iraqis,” with no U.S. bases and no lingering U.S. claims. It was prepared to leave Afghanistan as soon as the United States was confident that the danger of attacks by terrorists was under control. And – most importantly – the United States was prepared to enter into partnership with the Islamic world in a whole host of areas – including economic development, environmental challenges, and health concerns. Specifically, the United States was prepared to offer access to capital, to assist with education, to provide assistance in fostering entrepreneurship and the expansion of human capital in business efforts, and to share science and technology, explicitly including science and technology associated with energy, the environment, information technology, agriculture, and medicine and health.

But – and there is a but – in return for accepting the Islamic world on its own cultural terms and in return for joining in a global partnership to address the problems that Islamic communities faced, there was a quid pro quo. President Obama was explicit with regard to six U.S. expectations.

First, the United States expected the Islamic world to join in rejecting “the killing of innocent men, women, and children.”

Second, the United States expected the Islamic world to work constructively to assist in finding a solution to the problem of Palestine and Israel, a solution that will allow both nations to live in peace.

Third, the United States expected the Islamic world to support international non-proliferation efforts.

Fourth, the United States expected the Islamic world to support governance that reflected the will of the people. This was presented as a general commitment, not as a commitment to particular governmental institutions. President Obama picked his words carefully: “Each nation gives life to this principle in its own way, grounded in the traditions of its own people. America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election.”

This acknowledgement that there are many ways that government may be designed to reflect the will of the people (and that the will of the people might be a government that the United States did not much like) did not mean that a commitment to rule by the will of the people was meaningless, or that any and every form of governance would pass this test. President Obama laid out the parameters: “I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose.”

Fifth, the United States expected the Islamic world to permit religious freedom – that is to tolerate the practice of other religions.

References:

15 Obama, “National Defense University.”
16 Obama, “National Defense University.”
17 Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, 4 June 2009.” Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09
18 Obama, “Cairo.”
19 Obama, “Cairo.”
Sixth, the United States expected the Islamic world to respect the rights of women, in certain basic areas, particularly the right to an education.

It would be naïve and foolish to suggest that a U.S. foreign policy based on the assumptions and vision embraced by the Obama administration will make American relationships with the nations of South Asia – and Pakistan in particular – easy ones. The Cairo speech, while commendable both for the new policy articulated and for the clarity with which it was articulated, set out a difficult agenda. There are many issues on which the American and Pakistani people do not see eye to eye, and perhaps even more on which the U.S. government and the Pakistani government do not see eye to eye. And even when there is agreement on the principles, there are likely to be disagreements both on the definition of terms and on the facts, or the interpretation of the facts.

This said – and admitting that the window is a narrow one through which it may be difficult to pass – it does appear that the Obama administration’s foreign policy vision does leave open a window for improved relations and expanded cooperation between Pakistan and America. I think it is reasonable to argue that there is nothing in the current U.S. vision of world politics, the U.S. agenda, or the U.S. strategic approach that is, per se, unacceptable to Pakistan. Forward progress will require frank and honest conversations between governments and between nations – and, just as difficult, frank and honest conversations between governments and their own people. But a recognition that difference does not necessarily imply conflict, and a recognition that millennial dreams are both unreal and harmful, creates the potential for cooperation. It leaves open a window.

So there is, I would argue, now an open window for progress. We need also be aware, however, that windows close. Given the range of shared problems, and given the tight and ever-tightening linkages between Pakistan and the United States in our globalized world, much is to be gained if Pakistan and America can take advantage of today’s open window, seizing the opportunity to learn more about each other, build an honest dialogue, and work together on the substantial common agenda of human development and international problem-solving. Given the benefits both to Pakistan and to America, it is worth making the effort.
Regional Peace in South Asia through Economic and Security Alliances

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Introduction
This paper explores opportunities for building regional peace in South Asia through existing regional and sub-regional mechanisms for economic and security cooperation. It argues that increased economic and trade interactions in South Asia could potentially generate transformative shifts in state behaviour, as they have in regions such as South East Asia and Europe, where economic inter-dependence has functioned as a precursor to peace. The paper identifies the potential scope for and challenges in expanding and improving economic and security cooperation mechanisms in place in South Asia, as a pathway to sustainable peace and security.

The Economics-Peace Nexus
Regional economic alliances are increasingly being viewed as the way to the future. Post Second World War, economics has often guided the development of foreign policy and political relations among states. The experience of various forms of regional economic partnerships, among them, the European Union (EU), North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) and MERCOSUR or Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South) have demonstrated that frameworks promoting economic cooperation have the potential to impact both the security and economic landscape of a participating country and a region in a number of ways: a) promoting wider regional political cooperation, in some instances transforming a conflict environment, and b) stimulating economic growth through increased trade; faster and cheaper access to markets; reducing transportation costs; providing firms more opportunities to specialize and expand; attracting more regional and foreign investment; and creating significantly greater opportunities for employment. Hence, one may argue that the long-term and cumulative effects of regional economic integration could foster and sustain multiple security and socio-economic outcomes including greater regional stability, development and poverty alleviation.

Realists and mercantilists argue that unrestricted and free economic exchange compromises a nation’s sovereignty by increasing its dependence on other nations and possibly upsetting its power relations with adversaries. On the other hand, liberal economic theory suggests that such interactions promote contact and communication between governments and the private sector as well as creating tangible incentives in regional stability for various actors. This has been most evident in the EU, a region which saw a sea change in its security landscape as a consequence of close intra-regional economic ties. Regional economic integration of Europe created stakes in sustaining the cooperation of member states and proved an effective confidence-building vehicle between many erstwhile antagonists. ASEAN provides another model of successful economic alliances. While the region is still charting its course towards a deeper more comprehensive effort to integrate, demonstrating greater efforts to promote the free flow of goods, services, labour and capital through an ASEAN Economic Community envisioned in 2015, existing intra-regional economic exchanges have placed South East Asia amongst Asia’s highest performing economies. ASEAN has also demonstrated its political commitment to manage conflicts through frequent consultations, consensus and cooperation among member states. This process, a form of preventive diplomacy is dubbed the “ASEAN way” or the “ASEAN process.”

2 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
Types and Levels of Regional Economic Cooperation

Regional economic integration is the process whereby countries in a geographic region cooperate with one another to reduce or eliminate barriers to the cross-border flow of goods, services, people, and capital. Levels of economic cooperation may range from bilateral to multilateral free trade agreements, to more complex partnerships involving the adoption of coordinated regional trade and fiscal policies, and even wider economic unions such as the EU. Figure 1 below demonstrates various levels of regional economic integration.6

Figure 1

Levels of Regional Economic Integration

A number of alliances facilitating regional economic ties are in place around the world. Some of these trading blocs work within a region and sometimes function across regions. Asia provides many such examples. ASEAN for instance, promotes cooperation among the ten states of Southeast Asia, while ASEAN Plus Three links ASEAN states with the North East Asian countries of China, Japan and South Korea. Another example of inter-regional cooperation is the East Asia Summit comprising ASEAN Plus Three in addition to US, Russia, India, Australia and New Zealand. APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, a much wider process, engages 21 member states predominantly on trade and economic issues.

Regional Economic Alliances: Some Pros and Cons

Countries operating in regional trading blocs have had vastly different experiences. To be sure, participating countries have observed varying cycles of economic growth and decline and sometimes there is the lack of any significant improvement in economic performance, Mexico being a case in point, discussed in further detail subsequently in this section.7 EU presents another conundrum. Long considered a global model of successful economic integration, it is still muddling its way through a prolonged economic recession, which began in 2007. According to one analyst, the crisis has in part been a result of uncoordinated fiscal policies of economies participating in the economic union.8

Despite these caveats, there is a strong case for regional trade expansion in South Asia, especially when one considers that South Asia as a region demonstrated the world’s fastest economic growth during the previous decade amidst a global economic recession.9 While India alone is one of the largest economic markets and fastest-growing economies in the world, most South Asian countries have kept up an average pace of 6 percent growth annually during the past two decades, an impressive record.10

A report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that regional economic alliances are most effective when: i) countries are able to set aside or minimize their political and ideological differences; ii) when they coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies; iii) where bottom-up approaches across borders, involving private firms rather than the government, create supply chains; iv) where governments work very closely together to improve transportation infrastructure and reduce costs; and v) where countries successfully work out agreements on trade and investment norms.11 These lessons are important. Regional economic integration requires long-term planning, close coordination and an environment of trust and confidence. Working towards these objectives will be possible

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11 Alejandro Foxley, .p.6-7
only when South Asian leadership are able to jointly and consistently build a vision for the region; build political will within their respective countries; and collaboratively work on realistic and practicable short and long term objectives.

Regional economic cooperation has the potential to provide multiple economic, political, and social benefits to participating countries. Significant increases in intra-regional trade could have an impact on a country’s economic growth rates through greater trade, investment, employment and revenue generation for governments. Creation of larger markets through regional trade agreements may also allow small firms to expand their capacity and performance. This may also facilitate economies of scale, a reduction in average costs of production and lower consumer prices. Increased competition between producers across a wide range of goods can also lower consumer prices. From a security perspective, increased contact and communication between governments, people and the private sector could lead to greater peace and stability, or at least the avoidance of conflict as demonstrated in the ASEAN region, a key factor in the region’s economic rise. This is particularly important as the evolving global security thinking continues to explore viable alternatives to purely military solutions to inter-state disputes. A growing number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or trading blocs have emerged in line with this paradigm shift in global security since the 1990s. It must be acknowledged however, that regional trade is not a guarantee of consistent economic growth. For instance, in the case of NAFTA, a trilateral regional trade agreement between Canada, Mexico and the USA in place since 1994, the benefits for the Mexican economy that has seen many fluctuations in its economic growth rate are still being debated. One of NAFTA’s criticisms, for example, has been the fact that the agricultural sector was adversely impacted by a high level of worker displacement, partly due to increased competition from US firms as an outcome of greater cooperation. On the positive side, Mexico’s exports have exploded under NAFTA, multiplying fivefold between 1994 and 2007. Another positive effect of NAFTA has been the greater security cooperation in the region on issues of mutual concern, particularly for the US and Mexico. NAFTA has also facilitated trilateral cooperation on other important issues including environment and labor in addition to trade. Figure 2 shows that intra-NAFTA trade has increased at a significantly faster rate, than with other regions of the world. Geographic proximity and reduced transportation costs are key factors contributing to the ease and benefits of intra-regional trade, a natural environment for commerce many regional trading blocs are pursuing to their benefit.

Figure 2

A region that has more recently and very actively embarked on a trajectory of regional economic alliances is Africa. At present, Africa has a $2 trillion economy. Current trends suggest that Africa’s economy is growing faster than all other continents with about one-third of its fifty-four countries averaging an annual GDP higher than 6%. The African

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12 See for example M. Angeles Villarreal. NAFTA and the Mexican Economy. CRS Report RL34733. June 2010
13 Ibid.
Development Bank (AfDB) suggests that the private sector, improved economic policies and a business friendly regional environment mainly drive Africa’s impressive economic growth. These developments have significantly increased levels of trade and investment, with the annual rate of foreign investment increasing fivefold since 2000. Of note, the AfDB report highlights positive trends in regional economic cooperation as key features of future growth. Figure 3 illustrates the proliferation of trading blocs facilitating intra-African trade. Currently, there are six key trading blocs in Africa and a plethora of sub-regional ones.

Figure 3

While economic integration processes are still in very preliminary stages in the region with intra-regional trade standing at 11%, Africa is adapting itself very rapidly to the emergent landscape of increased cooperation.

The Case for Regional Economic Partnerships in South Asia

This section considers why South Asia should pursue regional economic integration far more vigorously than it has thus far. It also examines key challenges in furthering economic cooperation in the region. Although South Asia has emerged as one of the world’s fastest growing regions economically, it is home to half the world’s poor (the largest concentration of poor people), and is still the least integrated global economic region. Scholars often refer to South Asia as a development paradox, because despite rapid economic growth, poverty (in terms of absolute numbers) has grown over the years, human developments levels remain poor and the benefits of development remain unevenly distributed.

According to a World Bank study, nearly 70% of South Asia’s populace lives in underdeveloped or lagging regions.

While SAARC was established in 1984 to promote economic cooperation to benefit the whole region, over the years intra-regional trade levels have declined. Intra-regional trade stood at 19% of annual regional GDP in 1948 (in the wake of the British post-colonial era), and presently it stands at a negligible 6% (refer to Figure 4 below) of its regional GDP. It should be noted that the region is known to have very high tariff and non-tariff regional trade barriers, severely impeding the flow of trade, labour, and capital.

Consider the intra-regional trade levels of other regions: EU intra-regional trade levels stand at 60%; NAFTA at 40%; and ASEAN at 30% of the annual regional GDP. It appears clear that South Asia is missing out on an opportunity for significantly greater gains in economic growth and poverty reduction.


20 Ibid. p. v.


Figure 4

**Figure 4**

Intraregional FDI Shares in Asia and the Pacific: 1995-2005

![Graph showing FDI shares](image)

*Source: Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC)*

Investment integration measured using the annual FDI (AFDI) share — the % of regional FDI inflows to the total FDI from the investing region — show that SA and Central & West Asia are least integrated among the subregions.

Figure 5

**Regional Cooperation and Integration in South Asia**

**Intra-regional Trade Share 2010**

![Diagram showing trade shares](image)

*Source: Asian Development Bank*

Figure 5 suggests that intra-regional trade in South Asia remains drastically low. Intra-regional trade is facilitated through various mechanisms. The most prominent framework for cooperation, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) comprises the eight South Asian states including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan; India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. SAARC is still far from delivering on its vision for robust economic cooperation. While it aims to promote peace, trade and development among its members, its capacity to function as an effective mechanism for cooperation has been widely debated. In terms of its capacity to boost economic cooperation, the adoption of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) treaty in 2006 provides the framework for stimulating intra-regional trade and integration. One of SAFTA’s primary objectives is to create a South Asian Economic Union by 2020. Arguably, this is an ambitious goal and unrealistic given the discouragingly low levels of cooperation in the region.

A less known mechanism for regional cooperation, endorsed by SAARC, is the South Asian Sub-regional Economic Cooperation program (SASEC). It was conceived in 1996 and includes India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Many South Asian countries are also members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation or BIMSTEC, bringing together some South and South East Asian countries including Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. BIMSTEC aims to achieve its own free trade area by 2017. Intra-regional trade under this mechanism also shows ample space for greater cooperation.

Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan alone is abysmally low at 4 % of the total trade within the SAARC region.\(^2^9\) It has been severely restricted by decades of mutual distrust, unresolved political disputes, and policies inhibiting the free movement of goods and people. To India’s credit, it granted Pakistan the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status in 1996 to facilitate bilateral commerce but Pakistan has yet to reciprocate this policy under the norms guided by the World Trade Organization.\(^2^9\) Commerce across all of South Asia is generally highly underdeveloped. Economic linkages and official interaction among stakeholders are negligible, both between India and Pakistan and among the countries that are members of SAARC. Despite many predictable gains for the region, a number of factors have hindered trade. Tenuous inter-state relations and the sovereignty debate are obvious barriers in creating the desired political will to move forward. Additionally, the fiscal impact of regional economic integration; small state apprehensions particularly concerning trade imbalances; high trade costs including transportation; lack of adequate infrastructure and appropriate measures to facilitate trade through ports, roads and rail networks; high tariff and non-tariff barriers; and visa restrictions have all contributed to a poor regional trading environment.

Fostering a Robust India-Pakistan Trade Relationship

Development of a robust economic partnership between India and Pakistan, the two states with the greatest influence on regional politics and security dynamics, could arguably pave the way for significant cooperation across the SAARC region. There is historic evidence for such a relationship between the neighbouring states. In the post-independence period, India was Pakistan’s most important and natural trading partner.\(^3^0\) In the first few years after partition, approximately half of Pakistan’s total exports were directed to the Indian market, and a third of its imports came from India.\(^3^1\) Indian currency devaluation in 1949, not matched by Pakistan, soon led to a steep decline in trade. Pakistan followed by imposing import restrictions, and from then on trade levels between the two countries began to decrease.\(^3^2\) It is only common sense that bilateral trade relations would mean higher employment, increased sources for income generation, reduced transportation costs as well as cheaper goods. In the case of Pakistan, it may even mean cutting health costs by bringing in cheaper medicines from India.\(^3^3\)

For India on the other hand, such cooperation could provide access to cheaper energy supplies from Central Asia by land routes through Pakistan, adequate to support its growing industrialization and consumer requirements. Normalized economic relations will generate economic gains for both the countries in a number of ways.\(^3^4\) Indian manufacturers can exploit the existing markets in Pakistan whereas Pakistani consumers will have to pay substantially lower prices than they presently pay for Indian goods. Pakistani manufacturers could easily tap India’s large market size. India provides an overwhelmingly huge market of 1.2 billion people to the Pakistani entrepreneur, which needs to be thoroughly explored.

Conclusion

For SAARC member countries, preparing the region for meaningful economic integration calls for close cooperation in three key areas: i) inter-state confidence building measures; ii) coordinated commerce friendly policies; and iii) and collaborative efforts in the development of trade and transportation infrastructure. Much greater regional cooperation is imperative for South Asian countries to strengthen their economies both individually and as regional partners. Such endeavours will attract foreign capital from outside and even within the region, widening and diversify their production base. Economic cooperation would protect the

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31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


individual economies of SAARC states in the face of the rapid pace of globalization, maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of the process.

SAARC countries have certain inherent advantages in economic cooperation. They are clustered within one geographic region, which would reduce transportation costs. Trade liberalization would not only enhance economic productivity and efficiency, it shall also have a positive impact on social welfare and poverty alleviation. It has been widely recognized that poverty and the development lag are most concentrated in remote border regions. Connecting these lagging regions with neighboring countries alone could potentially help alleviate poverty significantly. The consumers and the government, two major stakeholders, would benefit from lower prices and greater customs revenue from legalizing illicit border trade, respectively. The private sector will inevitably profit from access to larger markets and opportunities to specialize and expand. Improved transportation links, communications, research and development, regional trade financing, customs cooperation, and relaxing travel restrictions for the business community would enhance the regional development infrastructure. Greater economic activity would also help reduce poverty by increasing employment, income generation, trade augmentation and development at large.

A sustained multi-tier economic partnership across the SAARC region will help build trust and confidence between various states. A South Asian economic union where every member has an economic stake would motivate adversaries to resolve political differences or set them aside, and become partners in development. Opening up channels of communication and avenues for economic cooperation could build the foundation for stabilization of inter-state relations across the troubled South Asian region. The process may take a number of years and is contingent on careful planning and commitment, but the dividends of such cooperation could build greater peace and stability and widespread economic development to the benefit of millions of South Asia’s inhabitants.

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36 Ibid.
DAY I
AFTERNOON SESSION
Theme: Resolution of International Conflicts
The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) in a Conflict Zone

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Good afternoon everyone. My name is Dr. Allison Frendak and I direct the Peace Operations Policy Program at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy. We are located in Arlington, Virginia in the United States and will be celebrating our 20th anniversary in January 2014.

Today I would like to discuss the use of frameworks to assist peacekeepers and peace builders to think comprehensively about their work while deployed overseas. There are three main and inter-related streams to this talk—an introduction to the Peace Operations Policy Program (POPP), the development of frameworks over time in the United States, and POPP’s application of frameworks for different projects.

The Peace Operations Policy Program, or “POPP” for short, has been offering a master’s degree in peace operations since 1997. This graduate education is delivered in a civilian—not military—university, and the degree is the only one of its kind in our country. We study intervention into complex contingencies, whether due to conflict or natural disaster (or both), for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace. We are very much interested in the various tasks they are seeking to accomplish.

When speaking of this latter point, one of my colleagues always brings up the Bosnia mission. After the signing of the 1995 Dayton Accords, if you were to be standing on the corner of the Ferhadija pedestrian street in Sarajevo and just looking around, you would see many different military uniforms worn by the soldiers deployed with the NATO force (including the Italian Alpine unit with their distinctive feathers in their caps). You would see people in business suits, perhaps senior international civilians serving with the Office of the High Representative or Bosnian government officials or businesspersons. You would see NGO workers in their Birkenstocks. You would see Bosnian and international police officers. Ostensibly you could say that the internationals were all there working toward peace.

But if you dug deeper, you would find that they each defined why they were there and what they were doing differently. And perhaps the only thing that did unite them was that they were situated in the same place at the same time. (We know this is a little difficult for those who believe in unity of effort or purpose to hear—but what if it were true?) At POPP, we think about: How do you go about bringing all these different folks in to the classroom? They get into disagreements in the field based on their institutional perspectives and mandates. How can we recreate that in the classroom and then have learning moments about their differences? How do we get individuals to think comprehensively about intervention, including where they see themselves fitting in with a greater whole?

One critique of our field is that a) practitioners developed it focusing on b) operational issues: How does it work? Does it do any good? How can it be improved upon? We still do not have a formal “theory of peacekeeping” but much effort has gone in to the development of conceptual frameworks over time. The following are a few that have been created in the United States:

- The “Conceptual Model of Peace Operations” (CMPO) developed by POPP between 1994 and 2002.
- The “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Matrix” published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army in 2002.
- The “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix” developed by U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2005 and

I will be focusing on the first and last frameworks in this talk. Back in 1992, my colleague who established POPP wasretiring from the U.S. Army. Dave Davis was an engineer but spent much of his time in uniform developing simulations. He came to George Mason University to work with the Command and Control Modeling Center and within a few months had the opportunity to join Canadian peacekeeping forces for a visit to the Cyprus mission. My colleague saw the UN observation posts and initially questioned their ability to adequately observe the happenings in the Green Zone. But then he had an “ah-ha” moment—perhaps it was not about observing but really about the presence of the international community in this conflict zone to give the parties a chance to cool off and settle the matter politically. He thought: How can I go about modeling this?

We have to place this pursuit in the context of time. This was after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the relative warming of relations between the United States and Soviet Union/Russia in the UN Security Council. You will recall that
International Seminar on Peace & Conflict Resolution, October 2013

until Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia there was a lot of hope placed upon UN peacekeeping as a means to address international peace and security. My colleague returned home and held a series of roundtables between December 1993 and November 1995 with humanitarian/economic, military/security, and political/diplomatic actors. These groupings mirrored U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley’s conception at the time of peace support operations as a “three-legged stool.” The groups were asked: Why conduct peace operations? What makes them different from other operations? What are the component parts of a peace operation? How do these elements interact? The CMPO was developed from the responses of roundtable participants and research on the types of tasks these actors conducted in overseas operations.

The CMPO presents what could be involved in a peace operation in terms of functions, tasks, and organizations, and offers a better understanding of the environment in which peacekeepers work. There are four higher-order functions:

- a. Peacemaking—acting to identify, address, and transcend incompatibilities and bring contending parties to agreement.
- b. Peacebuilding—acting to create a structure of peaceful, equitable, and interdependent relations between people in and among societies.
- c. Peacekeeping—acting to control the security environment in and around the territory affected by the parties’ incompatibilities; and
- d. Peace support—acting to provide logistical, administrative, and personnel support to the overall peace operation.

Each function is divided into sub-functions with tasks beneath (see Figures 1 and 2 below). Tasks may be assigned to an organization at a specific time and place and may be measurable.

Figure 1. Higher-Order Functions and Sub-Functions of the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO)
Figure 2: Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief CMPO Sub-Function (detailed)

3.2 Peacebuilding
3.2.1 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
3.2.1.1 Provide for Food
3.2.1.2 Provide for Water and Sanitation
3.2.1.3 Provide for Medical Care
3.2.1.3.1 Provide Public Health and Welfare Surveillance
3.2.1.3.2 Provide Medical Services
3.2.1.3.3 Provide Surgical Services
3.2.1.3.4 Provide Public Health Services
3.2.1.3.5 Provide Mental Health Services
3.2.1.4 Provide for Clothing
3.2.1.5 Provide for Shelter
3.2.1.6 Provide for Additional Assistance
3.2.1.7 Conduct Search and Rescue
3.2.1.7.1 Search and Rescue Pre-Deployment Actions
3.2.1.7.1.1 Receive Mission
3.2.1.7.1.2 Obtain Background Information
3.2.1.7.1.3 Obtain Situational Information
3.2.1.7.1.4 Conduct Reconnaissance
3.2.1.7.2 Search Activities
3.2.1.7.3 Rescue Activities
3.2.1.7.4 Immediate Medical Activities
3.2.1.8 Provide for Additional Assistance
3.2.1.8.1 Provide Animal Veterinarian Services
3.2.1.8.2 Provide Veterinarian Health Surveillance
3.2.1.8.3 Provide Vector Control

P OPP has utilized the CMPO in a number of ways. It has served as an organizing structure within our academic program. When we hire adjuncts or develop elective courses, this is done with CMPO coverage in mind. We ask individuals to visit our “Practice of Peace Operations” core course to discuss what they have done in past operations. Students usually hear about a work experience different from their own and are able to ask questions of the guest. We select these speakers across the CMPO functions, typically a force commander, a UN logistics person, an NGO worker, and individuals who have taken part in demining, policing, elections, and evaluation programs. We have taught experiential classes where we take students to UN headquarters and then to field missions in Haiti or Liberia to better understand how they operate and to what degree the mission is integrated. Students analyze the missions, de-brief on what they have heard in meetings several times a day, and develop updated mission mandates as a final product all with the CMPO in mind. Finally, our program used to have a thesis requirement and several students selected their topic based upon the need to more fully explore a CMPO function.

P OPP has done much sponsored research with the CMPO. For example, between 1997-2002 NATO’s Consultation, Command, and Control Agency (NC3A) was interested in devising rational force structure templates for different types of missions. We made use of the CMPO to validate our task analyses drawn up for peacekeeping, conflict pre-

vention, peace enforcement, and peacekeeper extraction missions.

Several faculty members have used the CMPO in preparing for work overseas. For instance, in 2004, Dave Davis took sabbatical to work for several months with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Prior to leaving, he employed the CMPO to map outstanding issues in Iraq and the various international actors engaged in resolving them. This revealed gaps in activities. The CMPO is also a convenient tool for detailing or making sure, you attempt to capture, the processes and best practices associated with a particular function. By looking for other actors, you not only see where what you are doing fits in the entire operation but who else you might be able to coordinate with on the ground.

Lastly, the CMPO has been applied overseas. In 1997, the parties to the conflict in Liberia could not agree on modalities for a national election. With World Vision funding, POPP drew out the elections portion of the CMPO as a means for the parties to dialogue and chart decisions which had to be made, and resources, which had to be applied, in order to hold an election by a certain date. This process helped to pull the parties out of their rhetoric regarding the elections and dates, and to make concrete their decision points and specific necessary actions. The “Elections Support” sub-function is detailed below in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Elections Support CMPO Sub-Function (detailed)

3.2.4 Election Support
3.2.4.1 Election Support
3.2.4.2 Identify Rules and Procedures
3.2.4.3 Perform Election Management
3.2.4.4 Identify Funding and Resources
3.2.4.5 Conduct Voter Registration
3.2.4.6 Polling/Voting
3.2.4.7 Post Election Activities
3.2.4.8 Conduct Election Education
3.2.4.9 Monitor Election Process
3.2.4.10 Inauguration

The second framework that I would like to discuss this afternoon is the “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” The U.S. Institute of Peace and U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute developed the Guiding Principles with the participation of multiple U.S. departments and agencies that had personnel taking part in overseas deployments. The framework is centred primarily on civilian activities in these engagements, answering the question: What are we trying to achieve? Focused on host-nation outcomes, the Guiding Principles are meant to serve as a foundation for interveners to construct priorities for specific missions.

Those crafting the Guiding Principles recognized that while every mission is unique, and dependent on the local context, strong agreement did exist on their major components. Past frameworks consistently detailed security, political, economic, social, and justice dimensions. To help focus and standardize actions, the Guiding Principles translated these to five purpose-based end states (the ultimate goals of a society emerging from conflict):

a. Safe and secure environment—the ability of the people...
The Guiding Principles further acknowledge, and elevate in importance, seven outcome-focused principles that cut across and impact each end state, and affect every action of every individual involved in the intervention. These include:

a. Host-nation ownership and capacity—the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities (even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders).

b. Political primacy—a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace and every decision and action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreement.

c. Legitimacy—a) the degree to which the local population accepts the mission and its mandate, or their government and its actions; b) the degree to which government is accountable to its people; and c) the degree to which regional neighbours and the international community accept the mission mandate and the local government.

d. Unity of effort—cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, beginning with a shared understanding of the environment.

e. Security—the physical security that permits the freedom necessary to pursue a permanent peace.

f. Conflict transformation—reducing the drivers of conflict while supporting those that mitigate conflict across security, economic, and political spheres and

g. Regional engagement—encouraging the country, its
neighbours, and other key states to partner on promoting the country’s and region’s security, and economic and political development.

POPP has been teaching the Guiding Principles in its “Theory of Peace Operations” core course for the past five years. This has not supplanted the CMPO. Rather, the two models complement one another. In terms of practice, given its focus on outcomes the Guiding Principles serve as curriculum for “Strategic Economic Needs and Security Exercise” (SENSE) simulations put on by the U.S. Institute of Peace, with POPP assistance, since 2012 (see television screen in the background of photo below). In conclusion, while we still do not have a “theory” we definitely have developed more clarity on a comprehensive approach to peace operations over time.

Photo 1. SENSE Training, Staten Island, New York (2013)

(Photograph by Noor Kirdar, USIP)
Innovations in International Negotiation: Implications for Narrative Landscapes

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This paper was presented at the inaugural conference of the Centre of International Peace and Stability (CIPS), at the National University for Sciences and Technology in Islamabad Pakistan. It aims to contribute in some small way to the work of CIPS as they set out to help create a more stable and peaceful world, through their research, their teaching, and their peacekeeping practice.

Statement of the Problem

“Win/win” solutions to conflicts was born out of the negotiation model that emerged in the early 80’s (Fishcer, Ury, and Patton 1981). The cold war anchored the way we understood conflict there were two superpowers and each side had their own interests, associated to their positions. In this context it made sense to try and “separate the people from the problem” to ensure that neither emotions, cultural differences, nor identity itself derailed parties from reaching settlements.

Born out of behavioural economics and game theory, negotiation theory presumed that people are rational, and will either defect or collaborate based on their rational effort to meet their needs. Prisoner dilemma “games” showed that the rational choice was to collaborate and create win/win solutions; defection reduced the “value created” for both parties (Neale and Northcraft 1991). And it was assumed that people would know their own interests, that these interests could be assigned a value, and indeed decision science created the link between “utility functions” which were mathematical representations of interests in determining “pareto efficiency” collaborative outcomes could be assessed, if not predicted (Engemann, Radtke, and Sachs 1989). The emerging science of negotiation, underlying international relations, fitted the nature of the conflict of that time and made sense, until the nature of the conflict itself changed.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the fit between negotiation and the nature of the emerging conflicts began to erode—-as repressive governments weakened, and not only multi-party conflicts emerged, but these conflicts were based on deep hatreds between ethnic and religious groups. The break-up of Yugoslavia that led to the Bosnian war is just an example conflicts emerged between Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia-Ossetia, Georgia-Abkhazia, Ossetia-Ingush, Moldova-Pridnestrovice, and many others. In all of these conflicts there were what Volkan (1998) has called “chosen traumas and chosen glories”—people retain cherished identities from a glorious past that is denied and challenged by their Others. These are not conflicts that can be addressed through “win/win” negotiations for it is identity and its set of moral commitments that is at stake, not a set of “interests” (much less utility functions). And indeed, while some of these conflicts may have had negotiated settlements, as in the case of Bosnia, the “peace” is fragile, for the violence stopped but the hatred continues, in what is called a “frozen conflict.”

Today, the majority of the conflicts in the world are recurring conflicts, reflecting the reality that even though there may be negotiated peace agreements, the conflicts return precisely because these agreements do not address the relationships, but only settle the “issues.” Most of them are intrastate conflicts rather than the more traditional conflicts between states.1 As such, they are struggles that include history, memory, ethnicity and often-religious differences. And unlike interstate wars, between nations, the civilians, and most often women and children comprise the majority of victims. Indeed, women in particular have been targeted in these conflicts the UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) recognizes rape as a weapon of war.2 Given the violence done to civilians, negotiation toward developing a “win/win” solution simply cannot address or redress the atrocities of today’s conflicts in a manner that reduces enmity.

Negative peace, or the absence of violence, is all that can be created through negotiation processes; positive peace, or the presence of trust and healed relations that can form the foundation for collaboration and cooperation, remains illusory (Webel and Galtung 2007). Given the high rate of recurring conflict and the fragile peace that exists in these “frozen conflicts,” we can presume neither that nego-

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tiation will deliver on its promise to end conflicts and restore peace, nor can we wait and do nothing. Today’s conflicts demand new strategies for conflict resolution, ones that are not based on a set of assumptions that no longer fit the nature of the conflicts today. Neither is non-intervention a good option, given the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative. Additionally, many of these conflicts are transboundary----insurgent and/or extremist groups have networks that span multiple regions of the world; their violent ideologies spread through social media.

In response to the most volatile of conflicts, the United Nations Peacekeeping forces have played an increasing role in protecting defenceless civilians and reducing the spread of violent conflict. Pakistan, it should be acknowledged, is currently the largest contributor to personnel for these peacekeeping forces, with over 8,000 men and women serving in difficult missions worldwide. However, despite the invaluable role played by those forces in critical situations, we need new forms of conflict resolution so we can, eventually not just reduce violence, but create security through positive peace. To do this, we need to twin conflict resolution with strategies to support development; indeed, peacebuilding is often understood as coterminous with efforts to engage the local communities in the emergence of peace in their communities, for indeed positive peace cannot be imposed from outside, or from above, by the state, but it must grow out of the development of new, collaborative relations.

What are needed are strategies for negotiated settlements, even if we know that this approach does not produce real resolution. And we need new strategies for conflict resolution, processes that differ from negotiation in that they address the deep-rooted causes of conflict, rather than just the rational interests of the parties. To do this, these strategies must engage the meaning systems, the interpretative frameworks, the stories that people tell, in elite as well as local networks, precisely because the historical and identity-based conflicts are anchored in the stories people tell about themselves and their victimization by others.

Some of the conflict resolution practices that have been developed in the last 20 years seek to do just that. For example, problem-solving workshops bring together local leaders across society in a conflict zone, on different sides of the conflict, and help them reflect, with their Others, on the nature of their interpretations about their views, as well as the views of the Others (Kelman and Cohen, 1976). While this is not framed explicitly as a strategy for addressing conflict stories, it does indeed aim to do just that. These workshops can run parallel to formal negotiation process and support the development of new relationships among parties within the conflict.

Additionally, there has been increasing attention to local processes that support reconciliation, indigenous to a given culture/locale, such as the gacaca process in Rwanda, post-genocide (Brouneus 2010). Again, the assumption in these approaches to peacebuilding is that they must be local, requiring the participation of those engaged in the conflict in a process of reconciliation if there is to be sustainable peace. Dialogue, theatre, art, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions have all been used to enable communities to move through and beyond a violent history. And to the extent these are successful, they work to both recognize and reframe the stories that have anchored hatred between people.

It is this process of reframing stories that is key to addressing today’s conflicts. In the sections that follow, I will describe an innovative narrative lens on conflict resolution that has that orientation. I will lay out the foundations of the model and discuss its strength, arguing that today’s complex identity-based conflicts push us to develop strategies that move beyond traditional negotiation theory, toward processes that support the development of new stories about old wounds.

**Narrative: A New Lens for Resolving Today’s Conflicts**

“Narrative” is a system of meaning that has a structure, as a plotline of events that detail the actions (or inactions) of characters, and it assigns judgments to those actions, on the basis of the moral framework that is advanced within the narrative. Narratives have a beginning, a middle, and an end (Bruner 1991). They provide the architecture of meaning and they are “deployed,” like weapons in conflicts where each speaker (group) legitimizes their own actions and traits, while framing the other(s) as evil and bad. Narrative is the “work” that is done in the conflict----it is the place where people struggle to “win” by advancing their story, while delegitimizing, if not annihilating, the stories of the others. From this perspective, narrative is the location for the struggle over meaning; when people feel they are losing this struggle, violence is the inevitable outcome. Each group in a conflict has its own set of stories----its account of the past, the present, and the future. Each group anchors its own identity on these stories, and thus, when these stories are ignored or denied, when words no longer work (Scarry 1987)within an interdependent context, people resort to violence.

**Narrative Landscape as System**

The narratives within each group are multiple; there are inevitably factions. Thus, the landscape of narratives that comprise the conflict is extremely complex for it contains the complexity of the narratives not only between groups but within groups as well. This is the “first-order” complexity that contains the narratives used by parties to the conflict. However, given the interdependence and transboundary conditions of today’s conflicts, there are always “parties” to the conflict such as the UN, international NGOs, the International Criminal Court, as well as nation states that are impacted by the conflict, and of course, affecting the conflict. From this perspective, their stories are also critically important and function to escalate or deescalate the conflicts. For example, the stories that the United Sates is currently (as of fall, 2013) telling and enacting about the conflict in Syria have tremendous implications for the course of that conflict. And indeed, the U.S. narrative(s) about Syria are at odds with other nations, such as Russia, who supports
the Assad regime, and Saudi Arabia who is backing the “rebels.” This constitutes a “second-order” complexity, overlaying the first one.

Figure 1: Narrative Landscape
In Figure 1, there is a set of narratives that comprise the horizontal plane (#1, 2 and 3), and they be in sync with the broadest contextualizing narrative, (#3), (which could be a dominant cultural narrative) or they can be orthogonal to them, comprising the vertical plane (#4, 5 and 6). In either case, they are intersecting a set of narratives, and together they comprise a dynamical system. And precisely because it is dynamical, these points of intersection can lead to new meanings emerging, or establish sites of contestation and challenge. In any case, the core meanings that are in circulation, within these narratives (the plot lines and moral frameworks) constitute the “attractors” which structure and organize the conflict itself, for they become the dominant frames that are contested, around which the conflict swirls (Cobb 2013). For this reason, effective conflict resolution needs to be founded on the analysis of the core narratives that comprise the landscape of meaning, in a given conflict. Without this analysis, there is little understanding of how these narratives engage each other such that the conflict resists resolution, and ends up becoming a recurring conflict. Alternatively, should new narratives emerge, ones that anchor new attractors that support reconciliation, sustainable peace is then possible. This cannot be done from within a traditional negotiation model. For this reason, the narrative model offers not only an innovative perspective on conflict analysis and resolution, but also one that can provide the foundation for new relationships and movement toward positive peace, building on the theory of conflict narratives that accounts for these dynamical processes.

Radicalized Narratives and Conflict Dynamics: A Theory of Escalation
Not all narratives generate conflict. Some support technical innovation, others constitute authority, or creativity. Still others form the foundation of a national identity, or frame the meaning given to the birth of a child. However, there are narratives that foment and deepen conflict; these can be called “radicalized” narratives not because they are told by radicals, but because the narratives themselves are extreme.

Radicalized narratives have distinctive features: first, they have very thin plot lines that are used to establish blame and externalize responsibility; second, they have very binary and simplistic moral values that function as “black and white” system of judgment—there is no “gray;” third, the characters in a radicalized narrative are either victims or perpetrators. For example, in the U.S. there is a current conflict surrounding the issue of climate change: sceptics not only deny that the science proving that current climate changes are human-made is legitimate, they accuse the scientist of lying and misrepresenting their findings; in turn, the scientists accuse the sceptics of being stupid and ignorant, as well as corrupt, working on behalf of the coal and oil industries. On both sides, the plotlines are simplistic, the moral systems binary, and there are only victims (the environment or industry) or victimizers (the scientist or the energy lobby). In this context of radicalized narratives, it is almost impossible to work collaboratively toward climate legislation. As of this political moment, the same is true of almost any issue----the U.S. is extremely polarized and both Republicans and Democrats produce radicalized narratives.
across a wide range of substantive issues. As such, our governance is damaged, as is our democracy itself.

Outside the policy realm, radicalized narratives are even more dangerous. At present, the Middle East is enflamed by these narratives. For instance, within the Syrian conflict, there are groups denigrating Assad as evil, and working to impose Islamic law, on the assumption that other forms of governance are also evil. These narratives become proxies for other groups, outside of Syria, --Iran, Russia and Hezbollah—who support the creation of an Islamic state. Likewise, the Assad regime has a radicalized denigrating narrative about all his opposition, while framing himself as the legitimate (good) leader. Both such narratives are radicalized and radicalizing.

This is a very dangerous conflict precisely because there are small sets of dominant, radicalized narratives that have been adopted by many different states/groups. And the result is that we have, at the global level, a very “thin” conversation about the conflict. And indeed, negotiations are not only unlikely (Assad refuses to negotiate with terrorists and the Al Nusra refuses to attend, intent on their own exclusive agenda of promoting Islamic law.) Geneva II is not only unlikely to happen, despite the efforts of the London 11, but if it does, it cannot yield up “win/win” solutions that would hold considering such a diverse and complex environment.

Radicalized narratives are both the sign of a violent situation (even when overt violence is not present, as in the U.S. example mentioned above), as well as constitutive of a violent situation—they both reflect and create polarization (Pearce 2008). As such, they generate a dynamic that reduces the possibility of dialogue and exchange—e.g. Al Nusra will not sit down with Assad and vice versa. And from this perspective, these radicalized narratives are both cause and symptom of a violent situation—as the narratives themselves become more extreme, more simplistic, they can function as an early warning system, a way to assess, and begin to address, the emerging situation that has the potential for escalation to violence. And once the violence has begun, it reinforces the conflict itself, leading to more of the same. This highlights the incomplete solution that negotiation (without narrative transformation) offers for violent conflicts—the terms may stop the violence, but they do not, at a local level, alter the nature of the radicalized narratives that remain in circulation.

These narratives have a patterned development; they can begin with a complaint, which then becomes consolidated into an accusation, externalizing responsibility, which is then converted into is externalized—and finally, this then becomes the denigration of the (evil) other.

**Figure 2: Pattern of Narrative Radicalization**

The complaint is most often local and particular and is thus tied to specific circumstances and people, with a set of events in the plotline that depict a historical development. For this reason, they present a “thicker” plotline, a more diverse

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4 See Borum (2011), who offers a similar graphic, depicting the process of radicalization to extreme violence (RVE). Here, the graphic has been used to illustrate the transformation of narratives.
set of characters, and a moral framework that is not starkly drawn. However, if the complaint is ignored by the Others, it becomes, as Borum (2011) noted, claims of injustice, and are formulated as an accusation narrative, with “justice” as the core moral framework. Accusations must by necessity shorten and truncate Complaints, as they work to drive home the point that there has been a moral wrong done. Accusations emerge the other as victimizer, and the speaker as victim. The final step in the radicalization of narrative is the Denigration of the other as evil. This moves beyond an Accusation and becomes a narrative in which the survival of the Self/speaker is dependent on the annihilation of the Evil Other. While an Accusation draws attention to the wrongdoing, the Denigration of the other is a call to violence, setting up the either/or conditions for survival of Us or Them. This process of narrative radicalization has its own path dependency—that it, once it is in motion, if ignored by the Other, Complaints develop into Accusations of injustice, which then become Denigration of the other as evil. And once this happens, it is very difficult to unseat or transform the interactional pattern these radicalized narratives generate, which is all too often a process of disengagement—exchange and interaction decline, the narrative becomes a master narrative within each group, and polarization is complete. And once words are no longer possible, violence becomes the only alternative.

This is due in part to the fracture of the social networks where there otherwise could be links and bridges between groups, enabling exchange and connections that reduce and forestall the process of narrative radicalization (Varshney 2001). When groups become polarized, these kinds of links disappear, and there is little opportunity for the constructive evolution of narratives. The research on social networks fits hand and glove with the research on narrative—the more radical the narrative, the more disconnected the social networks across groups. As the conflict escalates, the social networks become more polarized (Labianca, Brass, and Gray 1998; Cox 2009). This leads to high bonding capital (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009) and reducing bridging capital (Nan 2008).

We can see, through this brief description, that the nature of radicalized narratives, in the landscape of both intra- and intergroup narratives, can contribute to conflict escalation and the creation of exclusionary, rather than inclusionary, social networks. This description deepens and complicates the description of protracted conflict, and sets up the requirement for approaches to conflict resolution that can address the production and evolution of narratives that can support the emergence of collaborative relations and positive peace.

**Transforming Radicalized Narratives in Protracted Conflict - An Innovative Model for Peacebuilding**

There are three phases of a narrative approach to the resolution, or transformation, of protracted conflicts. These phases work to (1) identify the diversity of the stories that comprise narrative landscape in a protracted conflict, (2) develop the narratives within a given group, folding in the narratives of the subgroup as a foundation for considering, and contesting possible Futures, and finally, (3) narrative mediation between core parties to the conflict. Together these phases provide the foundation for the evolution, if not transformation, of the central and radical narratives that anchor a protracted conflict, which is, in turn, bedrock to any peace agreement.

**Phase 1- Narrative Mapping**

All too often, those that seek to bring about the resolution of a protracted conflict fail to pay attention to the complexity of the narrative landscape. For example, in the context of the Middle East conflict, most of the negotiation efforts have centred on the narratives of the Palestinians, particularly from Fatah, excluding Hamas, as well as the narratives of Israel. Most often, negotiations draw on the narratives told by elites only, and fail to consider the complexity on the ground. In this case, there are broad groups of people pertinent to the negotiations that are not considered. For example, the Palestinian Israelis are often presumed to be equivalent, narrative wise, to the Palestinians in the West Bank. However, because they live in proximity to Jewish Israelis, the stories they tell about the conflict are very different. They are an untapped resource for the peace negotiations, as they are able to tell a more complicated narrative, less radicalized, than their Palestinian counterparts. Fakhira Halloun, a doctoral candidate at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, at George Mason University, has described the “buried potential” of the Palestinian Israelis to support a peace process. And this potential is indeed “buried” precisely because their narratives have not been considered as a critically important feature of the narrative landscape in this conflict. Narrative mapping is critically important because it undermines the power of dominant voices, or master narratives, to blot out or exclude the voices of others. This inevitably opens up new discursive or narrative resources for those working to reduce or resolve the conflict.

There are multiple approaches to narrative mapping. There is new research using “sketch maps” to locate and depict individuals’ or groups’ spatial narratives (Boschmann and Cubbon, 2013); in this method, researchers use a participatory approach in which they ask respondents to locate, on a geographical map the location of phenomenon and the associated narrative that depicts the actions or issues they are describing. In the case of conflict, respondents can show where they feel secure/insecure, boundaries between groups, as well as the spatial depiction of a storyline. While the use of sketch maps has not yet been used to study conflicts, it can easily be used in the manner.

Alternatively, another method involves using sampling news articles and identifying the narrative kernels within each news story. A narrative kernel is a major plot event, within a given story, one which functions as a “hinge” in the direction of the plotline (Chatman 1980, p.53). Each core narrative, or voice, within a given conflict, will contain these “hinge” events that are particular to it. For example, it is possible to differentiate the narrative kernels that comprise
Assad’s narrative from that of Al Nusra’s. Assad’s narrative would feature the invasion of Syria by external extremists while Al Nusra’s narrative would feature the struggle against a corrupt regime, and possibly the illegal and criminal use of chemical weapons. Each of the kernels will have corollary characters and moral frameworks. In this way, it is possible to use media resources to conduct a narrative mapping that captures and reflects the nature of the stories in the narrative landscape of a given conflict.

Finally, it is also possible to use narrative survey methods to capture the diverse narratives that populate a given narrative field. Shkedi (2004) describes the use of survey methods, drawing a representative sample of the population, to capture narratives using survey questions, and then to compare and contrast the results, across the sample, and over time. This is yet another effective method that can be used to map a narrative landscape.

In summary, there are varieties of methods that can be used to map a narrative landscape in a conflict, the first step in the analysis of the context, the development of understanding of the nature of the stories that are in circulation, the people that are telling them, and how they see their relation to others in that landscape. Only then will those that hope to intervene in conflicts be able to assess the meaning that people in the conflict are making about self and other. Understanding is the first step in intervening in radicalized narratives.

Phase II: Intra-party Dialogue to Explore Differences

It is very likely to be the case in a protracted conflict that there will be multiplicity of narratives within a given side of the conflict. And most often, the group that dominates a given party will want to retain their stories’ centrality. However, their story about the history, the situation, Self and Other is precisely what contributes to retain the conflict dynamic with their Other. It follows that if the dominant group within one side of the conflict can be forced to open the space for others to enter, the result will be a richer account of the issues, the history, and the current situation. Intraparty dialogue and mediation can be used to decenter the conflict between dominant parties, and refocus attention on the conflicts within.

This has the effect of complicating or “complexifying” a given group’s understanding of its own issues—their story becomes richer, and this, in turn, reduces radicalization. For example, the opposition in Syria is extremely complex, and the set of relations between groups within the opposition keeps changing. Rather than set Geneva II as an opportunity for negotiation between the regime and its opposition, it would be more productive to host an event that would bring together the opposition so that it could assess, reflect and address the complexity of its own group. How are they going to work together? What are the (competing) visions for the future of Syria? It could be also predicted that the faction currently dominating that sector will be more reluctant to participate in such a meeting, as it may risk losing the hegemony of its narrative.

This intraparty work should focus first on the diversity and ensure that the marginalized voices within the group are recognized and included. Again, this is very difficult for the leading members of the group, as they essentially have to accept and address their own diversity. Second, they should work together to develop scenarios that reflect the possible trajectories that could evolve, including open conflict, if not violence, within their group. Whether the group-as-a-whole selects of creates a “shared scenario” is less important than the process of learning about their own diversity and their differences, as again, this reduces the radicalized nature of their narrative. However, should they be able, through excellent mediation, to create a shared scenario, the result would be a powerful narrative that can then shape how other nations and international organizations relate to the group. The Syrian Opposition would be much stronger if they were to reflect on their diversity, really explore it, and mediate their differences, in the creation of a shared scenario. And given the fact that scenario building is a conflict resolution process that has been very successfully used in both business and in political conflicts, it is an important and much underused strategy for effectively interventions in protracted conflicts (Blum 2005).

In summary, it is important to intervene in the narratives within a given group, using processes that support reflection, deliberation, mediation, and scenario building, as all of these are tools that have the effect of increasing the complexity of the narrative of the group-as-a-whole. We know that as the conflict escalates, the narrative of a given party becomes more radicalized, and from this perspective, it is critically important to address this prior to any peace-making or peacebuilding process between the parties to a protracted violent conflict. The development of the narrative internal to a given group/party sets the stage for new interactional dynamics between the core parties to the conflict, which can then be addressed in Phase III of a narrative approach to conflict resolution.

Phase III: Narrative Mediation Between Parties

Narrative mediation is a relatively new technology that has been developed in the past 15 years. Building on the work of White (2007), Winslade (2008) and others (Hardy 2008; Cobb 2003), it offers a new approach to mediation that presumes that the conflict is structured by the stories people tell, and the mediation process is designed to allow alternative stories to emerge. This process does not presume that “facts on the ground” can be altered by new descriptions, but rather that there are many different ways of constructing the problems between people and reframing the problems often opens up new ways of acting, and new solutions appear.

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5 See also Winslade and Monk (2000), who authored the first book on narrative mediation.
Narrative mediation maintains that the parties, not the mediator, have the responsibility to design the stories they tell. But the narrative mediator operates with the assumption that people are trapped in stories they did not make (by themselves) and cannot change (by themselves). So the mediator who uses a narrative lens draws on a set of powerful techniques and practices such as circular questioning (Tomm, 1988; Putnam 2004), externalization (White & Epston, 1990),\(^6\) positive connotation (O’Brian and Bruggen 1985), and reframing (Fischer 2003), as well as subordinate storyline development (White 2005). While many of these techniques were developed for addressing problems in the context of therapy, they have proven to be useful and pertinent to the evolution of narratives in protracted conflicts as well (Millard 2008; Cobb 2013). However, the field of conflict resolution has yet to fully incorporate these tools, and indeed, the more traditional methods of negotiation and mediation, which do not address the nature of the narratives at play, are the approaches that are taught in conflict resolution programs. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the contours of narrative mediation practice, indeed an effective and viable process can support the transformation of narratives in protracted conflicts.

These transformations are critically important to conflict resolution not because they lead directly to a win/win solution, but rather because they support the emergence of new narrative components, new plot lines, new character roles, and new moral frameworks. And it is this emergence that, in turn, leads to new narrative resources, and new international dynamics within and between parties. There is an abiding respect for the parties at the heart of narrative mediation in that there is an assumption that if people can open new ways of accounting for their troubles, their hopes and fears, they will be able, in turn, to author new possible solution frames to address and redress their issues, in relations with others. There is also a core assumption that the way that people engage each other often is as important as the content of the issues themselves. Narrative mediation support parties to engage differently, breaking old patterns that are core to protracted conflict, and opening new narrative trajectories.

In summary, narrative mediation is an innovative approach to protracted conflicts on the international stage and offers new tools and techniques that support parties to alter radicalized narratives, and support the emergence of new, better, stories, ones that can lead toward positive peace.

In Conclusion

This paper makes the claim that while negotiation may indeed be an important tool for peacemaking, today’s conflicts call for new strategies for addressing protracted violent conflicts. I argue that the path to peace is through the evolution of radicalized narratives, which, when transformed, enable the emergence of new interactive dynamics which in turn can provide the foundation for the creation of new solutions to wicked problems.

A narrative framework for peacemaking includes a three-stage process of narrative mapping, intra-party dialogue and scenario building, leading to inter-party narrative mediation. Given that the problem named in this paper is not just violence, or conflict, but radicalized narratives, these processes are designed to first increase our understanding and awareness of the nature of the stories in circulation, and then provide tools for their evolution, if not transformation.

Bibliography


DAY II
MORNING SESSION I
Theme: Peace-building and the United Nations
Challenges and Best Practices for UN Mission Leadership

Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal (Retired)

Introduction

Ladies and Gentlemen it is an honour for me to address such a grand collection of eminent scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping and conflict resolution in this room.

As you are well aware United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to help countries emerging from conflict make the transition to a sustainable peace. This effort consists of several phases and may involve an array of actors with separate, albeit overlapping, mandates and areas of expertise. Within this broader context, the core functions of a United Nations peacekeeping operation are to:

» Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights.
» Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.
» Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict.
» Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

The composition of a UN peacekeeping operation depends on the mandate, which the Security Council dictates in the light of the objectives to be achieved in the conflict area.

In recent years, there has been a trend towards the deployment of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations rather than the traditional operations focused primarily on ensuring and monitoring the separation of opposing armed forces. Without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defence, the Security Council may and increasingly has authorized UN peacekeeping operations to use force beyond self-defence to achieve certain mandate objectives, including but not limited to the protection of civilians.

The hierarchy of a peace operation extends vertically from the headquarters (HQ) down to the field level. The HQ level is characterized by intergovernmental elements, the Security Council, the Committees of the General Assembly, bureaucratic elements, parts of the Secretary-General’s Executive Office, DPKO, DPA, DFS, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the UN regional hubs.

At the field level, this hierarchy is extended from the top to the bottom of a peace operation or political mission in the shape of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Head of Field Offices (HoFO), representatives of various UN development and humanitarian funds and agencies and Contingent Commanders of Military and Police Contributing countries.

In addition to the formal hierarchy within the UN mission bureaucracy, there is a coexisting network-like structure of political, humanitarian, and development actors that all have their own bureaucratic structures and lines of authority. Further, international and local NGOs, diplomatic missions and finally yet importantly, host government and bureaucratic bodies all are factors that influence the success of the field mission in one way or the other.

Under these circumstances, aligning everyone’s activities toward a similar purpose and delivering coherently requires different managerial expertise and skills.

Before deployment and during the life cycle of the mission, the mission leadership faces various challenges and trails. While past experiences have led to best practices having been developed, no situation or crises is the same and it all rests on the shoulders and leadership qualities of the leadership of how they tackle every situation.

Challenges

The Security Council is responsible to sanction a peacekeeping mission.

To implement the mandate in the field the Secretary General designates a Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) who has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations to head the mission. The SRSG also establishes the framework guiding the overall activities of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and those of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT).

The SRSG is supported in this task by a “triple-hatted” Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC). This Deputy also serves as the principal interface between the United Nations peacekeeping operation and the UNCT; leads the coordination effort for humanitarian, development and recovery activities; and brings concerns raised by the UNCT to the attention of the SRSG.

In addition the SRSG is assisted by the Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Head of Mission Support and Chief of Staff to coordinate and manage his/her instructions to implement the mandate.
The generic structure of a field mission is as follows:

Missions are also facing several challenges on the operational level:-
» First, they are struggling with the implementation of new assigned tasks, such as the protection of civilians, linking peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and interpreting what is meant by a ‘robust’ approach. The absence of clear guidelines on some of these new tasks, as well as the lack of consensus among member states on the appropriate role of UN peacekeeping in others, has hindered missions from accomplishing some of these objectives.
» Second, political peace processes are weak or undermined in several mission settings (Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), etc.), which challenges the underlying assumptions of the ‘peace’-keeping doctrine.
» Third, missions are experiencing increasing conditional- ity, or in some cases even formal withdrawal of consent, by host-state parties (DRC, Sudan).
» Fourth, in the absence of post-settlement peacebuilding solutions, missions are experiencing difficulties in delivering effective transition and exit strategies.

Consent
In recent years, consent to UN peacekeeping has faced powerful challenges. Host governments either have called for premature withdrawal of the missions (Chad) or have so obstructed the operations that fulfilling the mandate became close to impossible (Darfur). While these challenges have been more direct than what the UN is used to, and may mean a new wave of discontent with UN peacekeeping, they are not new. How to gain, hold and build consent is a challenge that goes back at least to the birth of multidimensional operations.

In the context of peacekeeping, consent is the principle that distinguishes Chapter VI from Chapter VII operations: peacekeeping from enforcement action. Today, many UN peace operations have Chapter VII mandates to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians; the mandate of the Haiti mission (MINUSTAH) includes Chapter VII powers to support the transitional government in providing a secure and stable environment. The entire mandate of UNMIL is under Chapter VII, even though it was conceived as a consent-based multidimensional operation. Conversely, the expanded UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) includes the authority to ‘take all necessary action to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind… and to protect civilians’ yet was placed entirely under Chapter VI for political reasons.

The problem goes even deeper. In a minimalist view of peacekeeping, the ‘consent’ needed is essentially to allow the peacekeepers to serve as an impartial referee between the two sides. In a maximalist view, it entails consent to a significant external role in the transformation of a society.

As Darfur, Chad and Eritrea illustrate, the ‘bargaining’ process can become farcical. The need for consent, if taken too far, can leave the UN in the position of conceding a great deal in order to keep that consent. If it concedes too much, one wonders what the bargain is about. All the UN may be receiving in exchange for the concessions it makes
is the right to be there, without the ability to do anything substantive.

Robust Peacekeeping
The concept of ‘robust peacekeeping’ emerged in the late 1990s as a response to the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica, where UN peacekeepers did not intervene to stop massive violations of human rights, on the alleged grounds that they were not ‘robust enough’.

Robustness is supposed to allow a peacekeeping force to protect itself, to ensure some freedom of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate or more broadly the peace process is taken hostage by spoilers.

Two different conceptions of robust peacekeeping can be distinguished: a narrow approach and a broad approach.

The narrow approach is about enabling peacekeepers to implement their mandate thanks to their robustness, their robust posture, their robust equipment, and their propensity to resort to force, if need be, in implementing their mandate. This approach is narrow in the sense that it focuses on the robustness of the peacekeepers. This definition is by and large that of the UN Capstone Doctrine, which, in its glossary of terms, defines ‘robust peacekeeping’ as ‘the use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process’.

In this context, robust peacekeeping is also defined by what it is not – peace enforcement.

The broad approach takes a different angle to robust peacekeeping, by looking at it in terms that are more political. It is defined in the UN New Partnership Agenda as a ‘robust approach to peacekeeping’, which is a ‘political and operational strategy to signal the intention of a UN mission to implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process in the face of resistance from spoilers’.

This approach significantly broadens that of the Capstone Doctrine, by recognizing that robustness cannot be confined to the peacekeepers and their ability to use force in defence of their mandate, but needs to be embedded into a broader framework that combines operational and political parameters. In this context, a ‘Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping’ issued in 2009 by the DPKO Office of Military Affairs offers an interim definition of robust peacekeeping:

“a posture by a peacekeeping operation that demonstrates willingness, capacity and capability to deter and confront, including through the use of force when necessary, an obstruction to the implementation of its mandate.”

The document emphasizes that robust peacekeeping is a ‘posture’ rather ‘than a specific activity’, meaning that ‘robustness can be demonstrated in many ways, including the use of political dialogue’, but also ‘targeted sanctions against identified spoilers, or support and incentives to national reconciliation efforts. To a certain extent, the Concept Note seeks to reconcile the broad and narrow approaches. However, its focus tends to be more on the military/peacekeeping dimension of the operation rather than on its political element.

Protection of Civilians

Over the last decade, the mandates of authorized UN operations have usually included wording that provides these missions with the authority to use force, among other to protect civilians in imminent threat of physical violence (Burundi, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan). Whilst many view this as a welcome and much-needed development, others are concerned with some of the implications. Two interrelated aspects of particular concern are whether these new mandates require UN missions to use force differently than before; and the means through which these missions are intended to achieve the protection of civilians. One factor that undermines a mission’s capability to execute its PoC mandate is the presence of a passive and risk-adverse command culture.

Some key operational challenges to the implementation of the PoC mandated tasks include:

» Complex and sometimes conflicting tasks within the mandate:

» Complex environment.

» Insufficient number of peacekeepers compared with the vast number of civilians at risk.

» Resource constraints (which increase the credibility gap).

» Politicized environment.

» Limited intelligence capability.

» Capacity constraints of international as well as national actors.

» Lack of standardization and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs);

» Aversion to hard work and risk-taking.

» Negative media reporting in times of crisis.

Given the centrality of the protection of civilians to a mission’s success and the unique role and capabilities that UN peacekeeping missions can offer in protecting civilians, the United Nations must ensure that the following fundamental components exist for all peacekeeping missions mandated to protect civilians:-

» Threats to civilians must be considered at the earliest stages of planning, and the Security Council fully briefed ahead of its deliberations on peacekeeping mandates.

» The Security Council must clarify its expectations regarding the implementation of peacekeeping mandates to protect civilians.

» The Secretariat needs to address the protection of civilians seriously for peacekeeping operations.

» Protection requires a partnership with Member States that provide peacekeepers.

» The role of peacekeeping missions as protection actors must be operationally defined to clarify what missions do and the roles of individual actors within missions.

» The Council’s caveats for protection in peacekeeping mandates can provide the right balance for action by peacekeeping missions—if they are used effectively.

» Peacekeeping operations cannot ‘protect everyone
from everything’—and they need to manage expecta-
tions.

Although nobody expects peacekeepers to protect
everybody from everything, there is a need to refine our un-
derstanding of what can be reasonably expected of peace-
keepers, and how they can be further supported to ensure 
that they can succeed with this complex mandated task.

The UN Secretariat has sought to address this need 
by developing the DPKO/DFS Draft Operational Concept, or-
organized around the three-tiered approach to PoC: protec-
tion through political process, protection from physical vio-
ence, and establishing a protective environment.

Exit Planning
Once the end of the conflict has been reached, major re-
 sponsibility for security lies with the international actors. As 
the peace process develops, this responsibility lessens, as 
does the number of international troops and police. Nation-
al actors undergo the opposite process. During the interven-
tion phase, national actors have only limited involvement in
 guaranteeing the stability of the country. Their responsibili-
ties then grow with time, until local actors have become the
 sole providers of security.

International actors can moderate the risk of a se-
curity vacuum during the handover process by applying mo-
 bility and flexibility. In a worst-case scenario, such violence
 may lead to a situation requiring new international interven-
tion. At their arrival, peace missions are expected to build
 up security in a chaotic environment. Successful peace mis-
sions only leave a country when this vacuum has been trans-
 formed in a functioning institutional environment to whom
 they can effectively handover the task of guaranteeing long-
term safety and security for the country and its population.
 Exit planning should therefore ideally take place even before
 an international mission intervenes. This enables the identi-
fication of context-specific priorities of the mission. An exit
 strategy should further make a link with the expected post-
misson situation. The mission can then react proactively to
 the challenges involved in achieving a stable situation. Plans
 can be adjusted later as new information becomes available.

CHALLENGES WITHIN THE MISSION
Integration of Various Components within the Mission
Integration within the various components of the mission
is of paramount importance and essential for the smooth
functioning of the mission and implementation of the man-
date. Nearly all components have a direct reporting mecha-
nism to the headquarters in New York and also receive in-
structions directly yet they must keep the SRSG informed
and work in unison and on the SRSGs direction. Any other
way will create friction within the mission and is counterpro-
ductive. The purpose of appointing a resident coordinator
for the UN country team is the same. For this purpose vari-
ous forums have been formed at the mission level i.e. MLT,
SMT etc. which assist in this.

Within the mission at regional or sector levels, the
same mechanism as at the headquarters is also available
and applied. However, the chances of friction at the sector
and regional level were found to be more because of the
quality of leadership available, egos and experience of the
individuals. Friction generally develops between the Civilian
Staff, military, police, mission support and the security staff
stationed at sector and regional levels.

This friction can be avoided and overcome by close
oversight of the senior leadership of what all is happening
in the regions and sectors and frequent visits. This is espe-
cially important in the context of implementation of PoC
mandates and tasks. Missions also need to harmonize PoC
efforts across the UN system and coordinate better with lo-
cal and other partners to ensure better implementation.

Force Generation
The purpose of this process is to generate qualified forces
and staff in a timely manner. There is a system of outreach
to TCCs through the UN Standby Arrangements System (UN-
SAS), allowing TCC to sign a memorandum of understanding
with the UN. However, as Member-State pledges are non-
binding, the UN often has to accept what is offered rather
than seeking key capabilities.

Slow recruitment and deployment hamper a mis-
sion’s ability to implement its mandate, while at the same
time undermining the credibility of the UN among the host
government and international community. In some cases,
bilateral deployments alongside or in advance of UN peace-
keeping operations are vital for effective response by the
international community.

UN interventions are increasingly more and more
in intra-state conflicts with parties, which have less political
capital to lose. The inclusion of Protection of Civilian (POC)
tasks in the mandate and Robust Peacekeeping concept
need very specialized capacities i.e. force multipliers and
enablers. Such capacity in any army in the world is always
in short supply especially in developing countries. Countries
that have them are not forthcoming in providing the same.

Conduct of Operations
Further to the appropriate generation of forces and plan-
nning, success in the field is also dependent on effective com-
mand and leadership. Two key capabilities are required:
good intelligence and effective mobility. Both of these are
lacking in UN peacekeeping missions. However, there is
no margin for error, as action, or inaction, has a direct and
critical impact on the security of the people the mission is
mandated to protect. Hence, judgment and initiative are as
important as good equipment and sound tactics.

Leadership and direction are key factors in over-
coming these shortcomings, in particular since effective
leaders can generate mission- and context-specific coher-
ence on issues where the larger UN system is unable to
agree because of various political and institutional factors.
Selection of Heads of Mission (SRSGs), Force Comman-
ders, Police Commissioners and other senior appointments
should be undertaken with greater care in the future. Upon
appointment, more effort should be devoted to fostering
a team culture, and ensuring that the leadership team ad-
Military Planning

Peacekeepers need clear and practical guidance to be able to deliver on the mandated responsibility to protect civilians. This guidance further needs to be translated into streamlined operational practices. Moreover, early integration of protection priorities in the mission planning and incorporation of lessons identified from the field are essential for the implementation of mandated tasks. While PoC is an overall mandate objective rather than a defined military task, there is a need to define ways in which the military can make constructive contributions in support of mission efforts to protect civilians, to improve local capacity, and support confidence building in the peace process. This will require enhanced preparatory training and standardization amongst troop and police contributors. The importance of having an interface between military and police is essential.

Concept of Operation, Rules of Engagement and Graduated Response

DPKO issues the Rules of Engagement and Concept of Operations and then their respective Advisors send these to the mission military and police commanders. Finally, the USG DPKO approves these. Both the guidelines for the Military and Police are different from each other and at times in conflict in places especially in the role of the first respondent to a crisis. The issue of graduated response works well in theory, however where there is only military present it cannot wait for the Formed Police Units (FPUs) to arrive, it has to respond in order to avert the crises from escalating.

Some believe the ROE to be sufficiently clear and comprehensive; whereas others hold that, they remain too ambiguous and could therefore be misused by those who favour a passive approach. Force Commanders and Police Commissioners must ensure that the operational and tactical commanders have understood and communicated the implications of the ROE and that the requisite coordination takes place at all levels within the mission as to how would the two respond in a crisis.

There is a need to hold managers and commanders responsible for failure to act.

In Mission Contingency Training

The habit to practice various contingencies is non-existent in field missions. The only exercise is the quarterly exercise under taken by Chief Security Advisor for practicing evacuation of UN personal only.

The military must practice contingencies such as reacting to civil disturbances in cooperation with Local and UN Police, threat to UN compounds, refugee camps, evacuation of refugees, and support of humanitarian convoys.

Even CSA organized evacuation exercises must take into account the participation of the military and police personnel without whose integration evacuation may not be possible. Nothing happens in isolation; all integers have to work together.

Conclusion

As long as conflict remains part of the international scene, the factors of legitimacy, burden sharing, comprehensiveness and flexibility will mean that the UN will continue to be called upon to deploy peace operations, sometimes alone, sometimes with other partners.

For these missions to be successful it is essential that the Security Council involve the resource providers, the financiers and the host country or parties to the conflict during the formulation of the mandate stage so that the adopted mandate is something that can be implemented effectively in the mission area and does not end up becoming a bone of conflict between the political decision makers, the resource provides and a constraint for the mission leadership.

In Addition Emphasis Needs to be Laid on

Correct selection of the senior leadership and their training. This will help in ensuring smooth integration and functioning within the mission and thus lead to effective implementation of the mandate and a successful mission.

Integration of all entities working in the mission area under the overall ambit of the SRSG.

Placing demands for robustness and PoC tasks without providing the resources only defeats their inclusion in the mandate.

Ensuring exit strategies are part of the planning process from day one and thus help in formulation of benchmarks for the mission to achieve.

THANK YOU
ECOWAS Experience

Mr Fiifi Edu-Afful
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Introduction
Global interest in peace operations have increased considerably following periods of incessant wars, internal conflict, secessionism and inter-state wars. The post-cold war era and the euphoria for political independence especially on the African continent saw a quantum leap in the reported incidence of conflict on the continent. Between 1990 and the early 2000, Sub-Saharan Africa dominated the world landscape as the most conflict prone region on the globe. Consequently, various international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have and continue to engineer peaceful means through which these numerous conflicts that confront the African continent could be resolved. From Liberia in 1990, Guinea Bissau in 1997, Sierra Leone in 1998, Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 and in recent years Mali in 2013, ECOWAS peacekeepers have been deployed across the sub-region.

ECOWAS within the past two decades has alone initiated several peacekeeping interventions within the West African sub-region to address the growing incidence of conflict. Against this background, this article after defining its scope, presents some narratives on the nature of peacekeeping operations in Africa focusing primary on the West Africa sub-region. Additionally, the paper discusses the changing trends, peacekeeping methods and the normative frameworks for conflict prevention management and resolution in the West Africa sub-region. Furthermore, this paper outlines the achievements and consequences (both positive and negative) associated with ECOWAS peacekeeping methodological trends. The purpose of this exercise is to provoke some critical discussion around the contribution of West African peacekeeping to continental and global peace operations.

Resolving Conflicts through the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a sub-regional grouping comprising fifteen member states was established in 1975 under the treaty of Lagos with the sole aspiration of promoting economic integration and advancement in all the major economic sectors within each of the fifteen member states. The conglomerate of the fifteen countries is far from being described, as a homogenous zone as apart from its economic strength, territorial size, population and colonial history, the region comprises two lusophone, five Anglophone and nine Francophone states. This diversity is also shown in the number of conflicts that have surfaced within the sub-region. In response to the growing number of conflicts within the sub-region ECOWAS extended its mandate beyond its original purview of regional trade and integration to include regional stability and security.

ECOWAS therefore went ahead to institutionalize conflict prevention, management and resolution as a central part of its activities. At the time, the main security concern was inter-state conflict especially conflict between member states. There was no framework to guide intervention of any kind. All the discussion that went on which eventually culminated in the two major protocols on defence and security was geared towards addressing that concern. Article 1-4 of the protocol relating to non-aggression (PNA) which was adopted in 1978 directs all member states to avoid the threat and use of force or aggression against a fellow member state. Additionally, this protocol enjoins all member states to abstain from condoning or encouraging any acts of rebellion, violence or antagonism against a fellow state. On the other hand, the protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence (PMAD) identified armed threat against a member state as a potential threat against the entire sub region, which required mutual assistance and aid to triumph over it.

The Liberia event of 1990 tested the resolve of the two defence protocols on non-aggression and mutual assistance that has been in existence since the 1970s and the 1980s. Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in December of 1989 initiated an armed invasion into Liberia with the clear intention of toppling the...
then ruling government of President Samuel Doe.⁴ The result-ant skirmishes led to many civilian deaths, displacement of thousands of locals and other nationals of West African origin and the destruction of property.⁵ This invasion had a rippling effect on the sub-region as neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea later had to suffer their fair share of the conflict. The intensification and spread of these conflicts called into question the ability of ECOWAS to proceed with its integration drive in the midst of this turmoil.

ECOMOG was deployed to prevent the warring factions from further destruction, oversee the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, and disarm the warring factions and to terminate the importation of arms.⁶ However, this deployment came with several disagreements and controversies among member states.⁷ These disagreements that characterized the decision by ECOMOG to intervene in the Liberian conflict exposed the inconsistencies within the two major defence protocols. While some critics were of the view that the PNA prevented ECOWAS from intervening in the Liberian conflict, which was seen as purely an internal affair, others argued that the PMAD had given ECOWAS the responsibility and the locus to intervene in the affairs of a member country in distress. The objections that heralded the decision to send ECOWAS peacekeepers into Liberia led to the holding of several meeting, the apex being the signing of a revised treaty in Benin in 1993.⁸

This revised treaty was explicit and gave extra backing to the maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region. Accordingly, the revised treaty culminated in the signing of a much improved protocol on conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in Lomé, Togo on the 10th of December 1999.⁹ This new protocol touched on all the major ingredients of international intervention such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. Moreover, the new protocol was further strengthened following the subsequent signing of an additional protocol on democracy and good governance and the moratorium on the manufacture, importation and exportation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the sub-region.¹⁰ When it came to the implementation of the preventive portions of the Mechanism, ECOWAS was often times found wanting as they showed the lack of finesse in executing a properly intended plan. Repeatedly, overcoming conflict within the sub-region has been characterized by weak harmonization of internal structures, exploitation and misdirection of existing human capacities as well as the deployment of limited resources.¹¹ Essentially, it became imperative that there was the need to create a comprehensive framework to address head-on the preventive portions of the Mechanism.

As a result, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was established as a way of addressing human security in the sub region within a broader framework of the ECOWAS principles. The ECPF sought to do the following:

» Provide a comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peace-building strategy that enables the ECOWAS system and Member States to draw upon human and financial resources at the regional (including civil society and the private sector) and international levels in their efforts to creatively transform conflict; and

» Provide a guide for enhancing cohesion and synergy between relevant ECOWAS departments on conflict prevention initiatives in order to maximize outcomes and ensure a more active and operational posture on conflict prevention and sustained post-conflict reconstruction from the ECOWAS system and its Member States.¹²

Although there have been a number of high points in the implementation of the ECPF the low points far outweigh those identified high points. The framework suffers from the recurrent issues of funding, lack of political will among member states, lack of coordination between member states, ECOWAS and civil society groups.¹³ Aside these


⁵ Ibid.,

⁶ Festus Aboagye (1999). ECOMOG, a sub-regional experience in conflict resolution, management and peacekeeping in Liberia, SEDCO: Accra


⁸ Ibid.,


¹¹ The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08

¹² Ibid.,

identified challenges, the prospect of the ECPF as a functioning document for tackling all matters relating to conflict, peace and security is still high.

**ECOMOG’s Intervention in Liberia**

The entering of Charles Taylor and his rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) into Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire in December 1989 ignited the conflict. The intent of their conquest was to overthrow the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) government of President Samuel Doe who was accused of high levels of cruelty, economic mismanagements, political vendetta and the pursuit of political opponents and people with dissenting views.14 Besides, there is widely held view that the root cause of the conflict goes beyond atrocities associated with the Doe regime (1980-1989), but that the conflict is genuinely embedded in the historical and political past of the country.15 Within six months of active fighting, Taylor had captured about 90 percent of the country and had threatened to march his forces into the presidential palace to occupy the Executive Mansion in Monrovia.

As combat evolved with wanton destruction of properties and an increase in the loss of lives coupled with the exhibition of marginal interest from the international community, the ECOWAS established the Five-Member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC)16 on 30 May 1990 to use diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.17 By this measure ECOWAS sought to “lay bare” the severity of the situation and the exigency with which the prevailing conflict could be addressed.18 The lack of progress in solving the conflict from the diplomatic point of view coupled with the non-adherence to the Peace plan proposed by the SMC compelled the SMC to initiate the formation of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and a special emergency fund to find an “African solution to an African problem”.19 The reasons assigned for ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was three-fold. First, it had to do with the question of regional stability spiralling from a large cadre of refugees and displaced persons entering into neighbouring countries.20 Second, the emerging risk of sub-regional peace and security, with direct reference to the linkage to the crises in Sierra Leone coming on the heels of the Liberian civil war, and finally, the huge humanitarian cost of starvation, collapse of health facilities and other basic human necessities of life associated with the civil war added impetus to the need for ECOWAS’ intervention.21

The deployment of ECOMOG, an indigenous African security forces into Liberian capital Monrovia, was first to impose a cease fire and then to help form an interim government that has the capacity of holding a successful elections in twelve months.22 The arrival of the ECOMOG forces was not without some difficulties.23 The philosophy of seeking consent from parties to the conflict, exhibiting impartiality as well as using force only in self-defence was heavily compromised. Questions were raised about the neutrality, legitimacy and effectiveness of ECOMOG forces that were deployed to Liberia.24 These doubts explain, for instance labels such as “invasion force” “outsiders” and “flagrant acts of aggression” that were used to refer to ECOMOG forces.25 The deployment of troops, right from the onset, was fraught

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15 Ibid.
16 The SMC was made up of three Anglophone states (Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria) and two Francophone states (Togo and Mali)
18 Aboagye (1999), op.cit.
19 For details on cease fire and the establishment of ECOMOG see ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee 1990. Decision A/DEC.1/8/90
The ECOMOG Intervention in Sierra Leone

The first stink of ECOMOG’s involvement in Sierra Leonean affairs was when they deployed into Sierra Leone in May 1992 in an attempt to cut one of the supply chains of Charles Taylor. The deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia had used Lungi Airport in Sierra Leone as a base for the supply of troops and logistics to Monrovia. Similar to the events in Liberia, a group of rebels belonging to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led an onslaught to overthrow the legitimately elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Meanwhile, there were other interested groups, mercenaries to be specific who were interested in destabilizing Sierra Leone because of its rich natural resource. The ensuing civil war burst into flames following periods of bad governance, worsening economic situation and illegal natural resource pillage. The situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated in May 1997 when president Kabbah’s government was overthrown and he was forced into exile.

Unlike the events in Liberia, the reaction to the coup d’état internationally, was swift and spontaneous. There were wide condemnations from all quarters of the globe. The most significant aspect of the situation was the vociferous objection from the local population to the coup d’état. ECOMOG suddenly found itself in the midst of yet another deadly sub regional conflict. ECOMOG became directly embroiled in assisting the embattled government of Tejan Kabbah in toppling the rebels. In the cause of the conflict, ECOVAS initiated several peace agreements in its bid to restore the status quo. However, the inconsistencies within some of these peace agreements allowed the main protagonist (Major Koromah) to renge on his promise to return the country to constitutional rule. He used the period of the ceasefire to re-arm his rebel group. Subsequently, after

with certain fundamental flaws, with specific reference to the way first generation peacekeeping was done.

ECOMOG became a major faction in the conflict in that upon its arrival, there was no peace to keep since the warring factions did not consent to their mediation in the conflict. Consequently, ECOMOG could not exert its neutrality as an inter-position force. Questions were raised about the real motive for the intervention since some individual states were seen as having their own agenda with respect to backing the various warring factions implicated in the conflict.

In spite of these difficulties, ECOMOG was successful in establishing ceasefire in Monrovia by November 1990. However, this period of achievement was marred by the capture, torture and the brutal murder of President Doe by forces loyal to Prince Johnson. The persistent fighting of factions embroiled in the civil war, irrespective of the presence of ECOMOG forces, prompted the UN Security Council to impose an arms embargo in 1992, which was followed by the deployment of United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) with a Chapter VI mandate to assist ECOMOG in implementing the terms of the peace agreement. The signing of several peace agreements such as the Lome agreement (1991), Yamoussoukro accord (1991), Cotonou accord (1993), Akosombo accord (1994), and the Abuja peace accords (1995 and 1996) set the stage for organizing the presidential and general elections in 1997, which was won by Charles Taylor. It is worth noting that the first most important step at placing peacekeeping at the centre of regional security came with the revision of the ECOWAS treaty and protocols in 1993 that established a formal mechanism for responding to conflict in West Africa. This culminated in the drafting of the ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention Management Resolution to equip ECOWAS to deal with the complexities of emerging conflict within the sub-region.

28 Aboagye, op. cit, p. 87
29 Ibid.,
31 For synopsis of ECOWAS Treaty on conflict prevention Management Resolution see John M. Kabia (2009). Humanitarian intervention and conflict resolution in West Africa: from ECOMOG to ECOMIL. Ashgate:Surrey
32 The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh while the AFRC was led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma
33 Some of these mercenaries include Executive Outcomes, Branch Energy, Sandline International among others
34 Francis, David J. (1999). “Mercenary intervention in Sierra Leone: providing national security or international exploita-
35 tion?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2: 319-338
36 Ibid.,
37 Specifically, Abidjan peace agreement in November 1996, Conakry in October 1997 and Lomé in 1998
38 Prosper Addo (2005) op.cit.
several other negotiations, the Lomé peace agreement was signed. This paved the way for the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops and the introduction of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October of 1999.

ECOMIB Intervenes in Guinea-Bissau

The dismissal of Brigadier General Ansumane Mané, Armed Forces Chief of Staff for his complicity in the arms trade and trafficking resulted in a military revolt. Over 10,000 military officers who were dissatisfied with their conditions of service and low wages used the occasion of Mané dismissal to show their displeasure with the government. Events of June 1998 resulted in the capture of the capital Bissau by rebel military forces. Meanwhile, an existing security agreement between the governments of Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Guinea and Gambia ensured the deployment of 2000 Senegalese and 400 Guineans to help resolve the situation. This deployment connected with remnants of the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP) to fight forces loyal to General Mané and the standoff continues unabated. Accordingly, ECOMIB established a committee of seven in July 1998 to find a lasting solution to the raging standoff in Guinea Bissau. Subsequently, a Contact Group established by the Committee of Portuguese Speaking-Countries (CPSC) was able to broker a ceasefire by July 1998.

ECOWAS held several meetings with the intent of restoring the country back to democratic rule but this was highly unsuccessful as fighting continued. The Abuja Accord of November 1998 brought some light to the whole process, as it was able to elicit consent from the warring factions. This ultimately led to the establishment of an interim government of national unity, the deployment of ECOMIB peacekeeping forces and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Further, the Abuja Accord outlined a roadmap for the holding of elections. ECOMIB struggled to deploy troops to Guinea Bissau to fulfill the agreed provisions within the Abuja Accord because the “usual suspects” (troop contributing countries) were overstretched following their engagement in peacekeeping activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The inability of ECOMIB to deploy immediately provided the grounds for an escalation in the conflict and a disruption to the peace process. Consequently, the coup d’état of 1999 coupled with the inability of ECOWAS to deploy quickly to Guinea Bissau forced the United Nations to establish a Post-confl ict Peacebuilding Support Office (UNOGBIS). This office had the sole responsibility of preparing all the UN agencies towards the holding of a successful election.

Irrespective, of the positioning of the UN in resolving the challenges in Guinea Bissau, ECOMIB was neck deep in all the international efforts towards the resolution of the stalemate. The recent deployment of an ECOMIB mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB) comprising of over 600 military and police officers to oversee the implementation of the defence and security sector reforms is demonstrations of ECOMIB’s commitment to resolving the crises in Guinea Bissau and restoring the to a normalcy.

ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI)

ECOWAS went into action following the outbreak of violence in the Ivorian conflict in 2002. Considering the nature of the emerging conflict, an emergency summit was organized under the auspices of ECOMIB to explore the possibility of negotiating with the government and rebel movements. Unfortunately, the emergency summit was unable to resolve the crises although politically there was some form of consensus and goodwill within the sub-region for a speedy resolution of that conflict. Subsequently, ECOMIB together with the African Union (AU) established a Contact Group comprising of six countries to find a way of providing a channel of communication between the rebels and the Ivorian government. However, attempts by the Contact Group to get the peace process going was thwarted on several occasions following the refusal of the government of President Laurent Gbagbo to sign the Abidjan peace agreement. Later, further talks led to the signing of two important agreements. Specifically, the Lomé agreement and the Abidjan agreement led to the deployment of ECOMIB troops with the responsibility of creating a buffer zone between rebels and government forces.

ECOWAS’s deployment to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire was fraught with some challenges that ultimately affected the smooth running of the entire operation. First, the authorized strength of nearly 2,500 was woefully inadequately to deal with the situation. Second, most of the countries that had originally promised to send

39 Ibid.,
40 Ibid.,
troops renegade for various reasons. In reality, there were only about 500 ECOWAS boots on the ground. Third, the ECOWAS mission suffered from the recurrent challenge of funding, lack of appropriate equipment, coordination and logistical support. Amid all these challenges, the peace process suffered serious setbacks as both belligerents took an entrenched position. While the rebels insisted on regime change and the holding of fresh elections, loyalist to Gbagbo demanded outright disarmament of rebel forces. Nonetheless, the ECOWAS mission in Côte d’Ivoire was an improved mission considering the numerous challenges that confronted the previous missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. For the first time there was consensus from all the major stakeholders within the sub-region on the approach to adapt to resolve the Ivorian crises. The two major blocs Anglophones and Francophone were singing the same tune. In addition, most of the peacekeepers were taken this sub-regional mission through robust pre-deployment training before their departure into the mission area.

ECOWAS Standby Force Mission in Mali (MICEMA)

Following the military coup d’état of March 2012, insurgents and Islamic terrorist groups took advantage of the power vacuum created to get a hold on the huge northern portion of the country. These two major events prepared the grounds for the rebellion and the emergence of several terrorist groups. The threat of advancement of these terrorist groups down south coupled with human right abuses and the destruction of endangered artefact in Timbuktu became a source of worry to the international community. This challenge was further compounded by the inability of the Malian military to decisively deal with the threat from these terrorist. Thirteen out of the fifteen ECOWAS states promised to provide troops to the strength of 3000 to help with the situation in Mali. The intention was to support the Malian army to restore the country’s territorial integrity and driving the rebels and other armed terrorist groups occupying the northern parts of the country.

A transitional government was formed at the instance of ECOWAS and headed by Dioncounda Traoré, the Speaker of the National Assembly. MICEMA was a stillbirth, as ECOWAS as usual could not marshal the needed financial and logistical support to oversee the actual deployment of that mission. The United Nations Security Council by Resolution 2085 authorized the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) with a chapter VII mandate to support the national authorities to regain control of the north and to restore internal security.

Challenges Undermining ECOWAS’s Peacekeeping Drive

ECOWAS have encountered several challenges in pursuit of peacekeeping in many of the troubled spots within the sub-region. Key among these challenges includes:

Crafting of Peace Agreements

The wording of most of the peace agreements initiated by ECOWAS has been problematic. Often times these agreements are vague and do not offer any clear responsibility for the various stakeholders involved in the conflict. Additionally, specific timelines are not matched against these responsibilities and so its achievements are difficult. For instance, Liberia alone had about thirteen separate peace agreements while Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire each had five. In addition, key stakeholders such as women and civil society were virtually absent in the decision-making process for most part of these peace agreements. There is also the challenge of unclear mission mandates. Most often, the mandates are not robust and the roles of the participatory countries are blurred.

Inadequate Logistical and Financial Support

No peacekeeping operation will survive the test of time if it hinges on someone else’s resources. ECOWAS member states individually lack the financial clout to support such an enterprise. As it has been the case, most of the economies of its member states are far too small to carry the burden of peace operation. Nigeria the biggest economy in the sub-region had to alone shoulder the burden of ECOMOG troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone a situation that greatly affected its economy.

Sub-Regional Political Struggle

The seeming lack of consensus among member countries especially on issue bordering on security is a major concern. Again, another tricky challenge is the rivalry between the two major bloc Anglophone and Francophone countries. This rivalry has been played out in almost all the missions. The allegiance of these countries to their colonial roots places extreme complexity on decision making at the

44 Ibid.,
45 Gberie and Addo, op. cit.
47 These groups included the Tuareg rebel movement, the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), Ansar Dine, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
48 Alexis op. cit.
level of ECOWAS. In the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone while the Anglophone countries within the blocs supported the intervention the francophone countries mainly Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire opposed the intervention. Similarly, the francophone countries took special interest in the mission in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali with little or no interest from the Anglophone bloc. Also, the crave for hegemonic power for some overbearing influence and importance in the decision making process is of a major concern.

Complementarity Between Military and Diplomatic Efforts

ECOWAS is unable to build military, police and civilian components into its missions. From Liberia to Mali, almost all the missions have been military in nature. Even in instances where all three components feature, the synergy between them is missing. This has adversely affected the smooth coordination of the mission mandate on the field.

Conclusion

For well over two decades, ECOWAS through its various peacekeeping interventions have made considerable process in restoring peace to most of the trouble spots within the sub-region. ECOMOG symbolize a determined regional enterprise in the face of recurrent conflicts, violence and instability within West Africa. Besides, the interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea- Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire and in recent times Mali has demonstrated the desire of the sub-regional body to cater for its own and to preserve international peace and security. In spite of the challenges of logistics and funding, ECOWAS has over the years developed initiatives and has managed to overcome such challenge ultimately. There is still scope for improvement. Progressively, ECOWAS would have to strengthen its police and civilian component in mission in addition to finding appropriate funding sources for its intended missions. In addition, the proposed ECOWAS Standby Force must be established to address some of the deployment challenges that confront ECOWAS in the event of deploying into crises. Member states must also commit all their resources to ensuring full adherence to the principles highlighted in the ECOWAS conflict prevention Framework (ECPF).
DAY II
MORNING SESSION II
Theme: Experiences from UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa
The Experiences of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General: How to Prevent another Rwanda

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan
Former SRSG Rwanda

Could the Rwanda genocide have been predicted and avoided? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. The reason for this assertion does not lie with the benefit of hindsight but in documented proof available in UN records. The following are briefly, the reason for assertion:

» Jan 11, 1994 Force Commander Romeio Dallaire’s telegram to the UN in which he had related that a conversation in which a hard core member of the Hutu Killer high command had informed him that the Hutu high command had planned a genocidal campaign against the Rwandan Tutsis when given the green signal. That telegram went unheeded by the UN Security Council. On 6th April when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down by a rocket, the green signal for the genocidal campaign was launched exactly as predicted by the information. Within weeks about a million Tutsis were savagely murdered by their Hutu hardcore killers, the Interhamwe, in a period of three months.

» Even during this period, the Security Council failed to recognize and respond to the genocide that was afoot. This was because the Security Council did not distinguish between rampant genocide and civil war treating it yet another African civil war.

» The US recoiled from taking effective action because its peacekeepers had recently experienced chastening losses in Somalia. USA wished to avoid intervention in another African theatre while France maintained the UN was dealing with a civil war situation. France was supporting the rampaging Hutu government with arms and finance. The UN Peacekeepers continued with its passive Chapter VI mandate when the situation demanded pro-active Chapter VI mandate. Surprisingly at France’s behest, a Chapter VII mandate was given to its peacekeepers in a region of Southwest Rwanda to protect the Hutu’s from Tutsi vengeance as the Tutsi army advanced to rid the country of its Hutu Killers. Unbelievably the Security Council had approved two separate mandates one (Ch. VII) to protect the Hutus and the other (CH.VI) for the rest of Rwanda. The confusion in the Security Council lay in France’s biased support for the Hutu government and the fact the Rwanda was itself a rotating member of the Security Council, Speaking vigorously on behalf of its government.

» Throughout the three-month genocide, the inadequate UN peacekeeping force of about 500 comprising 400 Ghanaians and 100 Canadians remained frozen. It was only increased after the Tutsi army had defeated the Hutus. By then order had been restored under General Kagame and a broad base government of moderate Hutus and Tutsis was formed. The increased UN Peacekeeping force did not take root until December that year and was essentially peace building force.

Lessons from Rwanda

It is vital the UN peacekeeping force should have a clear Security Council mandate to deal with the ground realities. This did not happen because of the political diversions within the Council.

It is also important that a UN peacekeeping force should be fully equipped, like a fire engine, to deal with emergencies.

It is equally important that a UN peacekeeping force should be fully equipped like a fire engine, to deal with emergencies.

It is also necessary for the UN peacekeepers to be adequately funded to accomplish their task. Countries that have traditionally provided UN peacekeepers, like Pakistan, Ghana, India, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, should be fully trained peacekeepers (army, police, and judicial services) to fulfill their mandate.

The UN should have its own intelligence information in potentially volatile regions to independently assess situation rather than rely on subjective assessments of Security Council stated.

Meshing of equipment and personal:

A peacekeeping academy that trains military peacekeepers but also police civil servants judicial services:

» More women should be part of peacekeeping.

» Experienced peacekeepers should form a consultative committee that should prepare curriculum on training and hold a meeting once a year.

Global Village – Globalisation

Early warnings Pakistan – Muslim cannot kill a Muslim

Thank you!
Why Peace has eluded Congo: The Experiences of UN Peacekeepers Since 1960

Brigadier Mujahid Alam (Retired)
Former UNPKO Official

Introduction
Multiple factors have created crises in many parts of the world directly contributing to inter-state and intra-state conflicts resulting in large-scale human suffering and misery. One such conflict has been in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The prolonged and acute suffering of the people of this Region, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, continues unabated resulting in humanitarian crises of widespread dimension and unspeakable misery. The current crisis is a direct consequence of the ongoing unrest and conflict in the region following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The epicentre of this conflict remains the eastern region of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in particular the two provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu bordering Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The events of November 2012, when the rebel group M23 launched its offensive in North Kivu and seized control of Goma, highlights the stark reality of the fragility, gravity and urgency of the situation. It is widely acknowledged that more than 5 million people have lost their lives from war related causes in DRC since 1998 with millions more displaced internally from time to time over the last 15 years. It is the world’s deadliest documented conflict since World War II.

Over a period of almost 15 years of direct and intimate involvement in Africa and the Balkans, I have witnessed entire societies brutalized, perfectly sane human beings transformed into wild beasts of prey, countries torn apart with endless cycles of violence and whole regions thrown into prolonged turmoil. The Great Lakes Region of Africa is one such unfortunate region. What are the causes of this conflict and what is fuelling this prolonged humanitarian crisis despite having one of the largest UN peacekeeping forces for over 14 years in Democratic Republic of Congo? There are varied historical, political, social and economic reasons and factors, which we will try to analyse in this paper.

Why Congo Matters?
The Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the most important countries on the African continent. Its’ location in the heart of Central Africa and having borders with nine countries to the north, east and south and the western border opening to the Atlantic seaboard confer on it a unique geo-political and geo-economic importance. Anything positive or negative happening in the country is likely to have a ripple effect on all its neighbours and the whole region at large. It is a continent-sized country, which is 213 times larger than Kosovo, 86 times larger than Burundi, 24 times larger than Liberia or as large as Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Austria and Poland combined. The geographical challenge of having an area of 2,345,410 sq km cannot be under-estimated, as it is twice that of five other UN missions in Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which have a combined area of 1,180,820 sq km. Besides being one of the world’s largest ongoing tragedies, it is a potential political centre of gravity for central Africa and a latent African economic powerhouse. In addition to being Africa’s third largest country, it also has Africa’s third largest population at about 70 million. It is extremely rich in mineral resources having large deposits of copper, gold, silver, diamonds, coltan, niobium, tantalum, zinc, manganese, tin and uranium. It also has 50% of Africa’s hardwood and 10% of world’s hydroelectric capacity.

Background
Why has peace eluded the Congo for so long? To arrive at an answer I would like to take you back in history in order to have a clear understanding of the highly complex situation prevailing in the country and the region at large.

The Republic of the Congo (as it was then known) failed almost from the moment of its birth. Within days of the Congo’s independence its army mutinied (or was provoked to mutiny by foreign powers), the remaining white administrators fled (or were made to flee), the administration and the economy collapsed, Belgian paratroops invaded, and the mineral-rich province of Katanga seceded. These developments cast a serious shadow over the prospects for the successful and peaceful completion of Africa’s decolonization, at that point just gathering momentum. On July 14, 1960, acting with unusual speed, the Security Council passed the first of a series of resolutions authorizing the deployment of UN-led military forces to assist the Republic of the Congo in restoring order and, eventually, in suppressing the rebellion in Katanga. The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), launched in 1960, was the first large-scale mission having nearly 20,000 military personnel at its peak. ONUC demonstrated the risks involved in trying to bring stability to war-torn regions - 250 UN personnel died while serving
on that mission, including the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.

Given the unprecedented nature of its mission and the consequent lack of prior experience, existing doctrine, designated staff, or administrative structure to underpin the operation, the United Nations performed remarkably well in the Congo. Significant forces began to arrive within days of the Security Council’s authorization—performance matched in few subsequent UN peacekeeping missions. The United Nations was quickly able to secure the removal of Belgian forces. Over the next three years, UN troops forced the removal of foreign mercenaries and suppressed the Katangan secession while civil elements of the mission provided a wide range of humanitarian, economic, and civil assistance to the new Congolese regime. Measured against the bottom-line requirements of the international community—that decolonization proceed, colonial and mercenary troops depart, and the Congo remain intact—the United Nations was largely successful.

Democracy did not figure heavily in the various Congo resolutions passed by the UN Security Council; there was, in any case, no agreement during the Cold War on the definition of that term. The Congo never became a functioning democracy, but large-scale civil conflict was averted for more than a decade following the United Nations’ departure, and the country more or less held together for two more decades, albeit under a thoroughly corrupt and incompetent dictatorship of President Joseph Mobutu. This completely discredited leadership was fully supported and backed for 32 long years by many western countries, notably the US, France, UK and Belgium and, in my understanding, proved to be the most critical factor for the prolonged conflict and suffering of the people of Congo.

UN achievements in the Congo came at considerable cost in men lost, money spent, and controversy raised. For many people, the United Nations’ apparent complicity in the apprehension and later execution of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba overshadowed its considerable accomplishments. Because of these costs and controversies, neither the United Nations’ leadership nor its member nations were eager to repeat the experience. For the next 25 years, the United Nations restricted its military interventions to inter-positional peacekeeping, policing ceasefires, and patrolling disengagement zones in circumstances where all parties invited its presence and armed force was to be used by UN troops only in self-defence.

A Comparative Perspective

Before passing any judgment on the success or failure of international peacekeeping in the Congo, it would be worthwhile to have a comparative analysis of the task or mission and the resources provided to another international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. I was privileged to be part of both missions, therefore having the benefit of personal observations and experience. Most researchers tend to overlook or ignore this critical comparison.

Kosovo is a country of 2 million people with an area of 10,887 sq km. 90% population is ethnic Albanian speaking the Albanian language, with majority Muslims, thereby having a high degree of social homogeneity. The communication and transport network is reasonably good and the whole country can be traversed from south to north or east to west in less than two hours. After a brief NATO campaign, the international peacekeeping mission comprising NATO forces and UN civilian component was launched in mid-1999. The NATO military component, known as KFOR, comprised 50,000 troops from most modern and advanced armies of USA, UK, Germany, France and Italy with latest battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, communications equipment and highly sophisticated command and control systems. The support bases of these armies were close by in Western Europe thereby greatly facilitating relief, rotation and rest and recuperation.

Compared to Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo is a country of approximately 70 million people with an area of 2,344,858 sq km, which means 35 times more population and more than 200 times geographical area. Although, the majority population is Bantu but more than 250 ethnic groups have been identified. 700 local languages and dialects are spoken, although the linguistic variety is somewhat bridged by the official use of French and the intermediary languages Kongo, Luba-Kasai, Swahili and Lingala. The communication and transport network is extremely poor and primitive forcing the peacekeeping mission to rely almost entirely on air transport. In the same year as the Kosovo mission was launched, i.e. 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1999 between DR Congo and five regional states paving the way for the UN mission (MONUC) to be placed in Congo. However, in its initial stages it was a purely observation mission to monitor the ceasefire agreement and the total strength of this mission seldom exceeded 5,500 troops mainly from African countries. It was much later that increased troop strength was authorised by the UN Security Council and at its height never exceeded 20,000 troops, almost all from African and Asian countries with a sprinkling of very small contingents from some South American countries. All these military contingents lacked the fighting and communications equipment, and the much-needed attack helicopters were only provided after almost 6 years of the mission’s start-up and that too in very small numbers. The epicentre of the conflict has been, and continues to remain the eastern part of Congo, in particular the two provinces of North and South Kivu bordering Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. If we only compare these two provinces, which constitute less than one twentieth area of Congo, with Kosovo the stark and brutal reality of international commitment to Congo becomes very clear, notwithstanding claims and protestations to the contrary. North Kivu by itself comprises 59,483 sq km with population of approximately 6 million and South Kivu is 65,070 sq km with approximately 5 million people.

Factors Contributing to the Elusive Peace

A vast country with immense economic resources, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) has been at the centre of what could be termed Africa’s world war. This has left it in the grip of a humanitarian crisis. The five-year conflict pitted government forces, supported by Angola,
Namibia and Zimbabwe, against rebels backed by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Unravelling a war involving 7 countries and 40 rebel groups was never going to be easy. Despite a peace deal and the formation of a transitional government in 2003, people in the east of the country remain in terror of marauding militias and the army. It has been called possibly the worst emergency to unfold in Africa in recent decades. The war had an economic as well as a political side. Fighting was fuelled by the country’s vast mineral wealth, with all sides taking advantage of the anarchy to plunder natural resources. A number of internal and external factors can be identified as contributing elements to the elusive peace in Congo. While these factors cannot be held out as justification for the ongoing unrest they, nevertheless, help in understanding the highly complex situation existing in the country and the sub-region at large:

Internal Factors
» Very poor calibre of leadership.
» Very weak administrative structures.
» Pervasive corruption.
» Extreme ethnic divisions and hatred, especially in the east.
» Lack of democratic culture.
» Lack of accountability at all levels.
» Very weak civil society.
» Under developed and weak media.
» Very weak and highly corrupt security apparatus, including the military.
» Very poor quality of educational institutions, especially higher education.
» Acute deficiency of technical cadre.
» Extremely under developed economy resulting in acute and wide spread poverty.

External Factors
» Colonial legacy and its consequences.
» Foreign interference, both international and sub-regional.
» Under strength and inadequately equipped UN peacekeeping mission.
» Acute lack of commitment by some UN military contingents.
» Extreme ethnic divisions and hatred, especially in the east.
» Congolese lack of trust in the commitment and record of accomplishment of international community.
» Illicit trade and trafficking in weapons.
» Saturation of and easy availability of weapons, especially small arms, throughout the country and region.
» Illegal exploitation of Congo’s natural resources.
» The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its consequences.

Achievements and Current Situation
While peace has continued to elude Congo for a very long time, it would not be correct to conclude that all is doom and gloom and nothing good has been achieved by the international peacekeepers. To the contrary, I honestly feel that international community has contributed in a positive way to many elements of Congolese society and government. To further elaborate and reinforce this claim it would be useful to have a brief overview of the current situation in the backdrop of some important events, which took place over the last 14 years since the establishment of UN peacekeeping mission in Congo.

In October 1999 when MONUC (the UN peacekeeping mission), was authorized for Congo the country had a large presence of armed troops from six countries, namely Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia and over forty armed rebel groups operating in large parts of the country. There was also complete breakdown of law and order in most parts of the country. Within a reasonably short time, the UN with the support of regional powers was able to ensure complete withdrawal of all foreign troops. While rebel activities continued for some years, the UN mission was able to neutralize it largely in majority of the country except for the eastern parts where Ituri district of Orientale province remained volatile for many more years and North and South Kivu provinces remain highly vulnerable to rebel activities. However, it merits to be mentioned that more than 90% of the country is relatively peaceful and stable.

In 1999, there was no functioning government as widely understood in normal countries and the writ of state had been greatly reduced. While the government structures are still very weak and inefficient, it has to be acknowledged that important improvements have been seen and progress continues to be made, although at a very slow pace. Similarly, while establishment of a democratic culture still has a long way to go, it needs to be remembered that some significant milestones were also achieved with the help of UN mission and international community. Before 2006 Congo had never seen free and fair elections, in fact the country did not even have an acceptable electoral list, identity system for the citizens or a credible election commission. In 2006, the UN mission and international community organized, supervised and conducted the largest elections ever held in any UN peacekeeping mission in its entire history. While there were numerous complaints of administrative nature and law and order, the elections were widely acknowledged to be credible by majority of the population and the international community at large. I myself was privileged to be part of this historic process. Since then, Congo has seen another general election in 2012 largely organized by the government with significant international help. However, it has to be admitted that this election was quite controversial although an agreement was finally reached after a long standoff on formation of an acceptable government.

In 1999, the economy had completely collapsed with virtually no industrial, infrastructure or construction activity taking place. Similarly, mining industry, which was the mainstay of Congolese economy, had been reduced to only artisanal production. While the economy is still very weak and fragile, it is also a fact that large-scale construction activity, mainly in private housing sector and small-scale business, has flourished in many parts of the country. Important economic agreements have been signed with countries like China and South Africa, which have resulted
in some revival of large-scale mining activity as well as large infrastructure projects. European Union, as an organization and its member countries individually, have also contributed to some important economic projects.

In 1999, the structure of national army and police had virtually collapsed with large-scale desertions, acute discipline problems, division on ethnic basis and highly ineffective command and control system. The army and police had actually become a significant part of the problem. Since then, major reorganization and training has been attempted and a semblance of functionality and effectiveness has been restored, particularly in the national police service. The army still faces major discipline, administrative, logistics and command and control problems, especially amongst its units and formations deployed in the east. Security sector reforms need to be speeded up and assisted with the help of international community.

In 1999, the print and electronic media was virtually non-existent and very weak. The last few years have seen important positive developments in this sector, although it has to be admitted that coverage is still limited to big population centres. The civil society has also witnessed a revival and many local NGOs have been established dealing with human rights, humanitarian crisis, good governance, rule of law, security sector reform, army, police, judiciary etc. Congo as a country, and its people, has travelled a long way from many decades of civil unrest, instability, insurgencies and civil wars. The situation today is far from ideal but it is, nevertheless, far better than what it was 14 years back when the UN peacekeeping mission was established. While it is true that no peacekeeping mission can be a permanent fixture in a country and has to withdraw at some stage, it must also be acknowledged that premature withdrawal without long-term sustainable strategy can neutralize all the investment made by the international community, thereby risking a relapse to renewed instability and collapse of a society and country. This must be avoided at all costs.

Conclusion
Congo was a country in which everything was broken but the human spirit. A country in which everything was a legitimate priority, including human rights, humanitarian crisis, good governance, rule of law, security sector reform, army, police, judiciary etc. Congo as a country, and its people, has travelled a long way from many decades of civil unrest, instability, insurgencies and civil wars. The situation today is far from ideal but it is, nevertheless, far better than what it was 14 years back when the UN peacekeeping mission was established. While it is true that no peacekeeping mission can be a permanent fixture in a country and has to withdraw at some stage, it must also be acknowledged that premature withdrawal without long-term sustainable strategy can neutralize all the investment made by the international community, thereby risking a relapse to renewed instability and collapse of a society and country. This must be avoided at all costs.

Acknowledgements
1. RAND Corporation, 'The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, From the Congo to Iraq, 2005'.
Lessons on Peacekeeping Operations – The Indian Experience

Lieutenant General R K Mehta (Retired)
United Service Institution of India

Engineer Muhammad Asghar, Rector NUST, Associate Dean
the Centre for International Peace and Stability, Chairman,
co-panelists, Ladies & Gentleman

Maj Gen (Retd) Y.K. Gera an expert on Network Assessment and scenario building and I feel greatly honoured
to be here with you. At the outset, I wish to state clearly that
I am fully responsible for my presentation with no caveats
whatsoever.

My sincere gratitude and high appreciation to our
hosts for the courtesies and gracious hospitality extended to
us. We both feel overwhelmed. Thank you very much.

I recall and recognize the presence of Lt Gen Si-
kandar Afzal and Maj Gen Anis Bajwa and those officers
of the Pakistan Army with whom I had the opportunity to
serve with when I was the Military Advisor (MILAD) at UN
HQ, New York. Your officers and contingents have made
significant and important contributions to UN Peacekeep-
ing which I had the honour and privilege to witness myself
in several missions. My high appreciation and congratula-
tions. This peacekeeping centre that has been established in
August this year is one of the best in the world. The Peace-
keeping fraternity will greatly benefit from your work in the
years ahead. The programme drawn up for this seminar is
imaginative and forward-looking. I have personally learnt
a lot from the presentations and discussions in these two
days.

I think the UN Secretary General’s extract of speech
delivered on 13 August this year aptly conveys Pakistan’s
rich contributions to UN Peacekeeping – “Pakistan has not
only provided ‘Boots on ground’ but also ‘Brains on issues’.
The quote by Dr Mohammed Iqbal on the pelmet of the

main hall, “Humanity means respect for the mankind, let’s
appreciate the true worth of man”, is soul stirring and very
relevant to international peace.

I was expecting to hear some mellifluous Urdu
shairi (poetry) which is quite unmatched by anything any-
where else. Allow me to recite a couplet by the great Urdu
poet Mirza Ghalib, ‘Kuch yun hi zindagi ko Asan sa bana
liya, kisi se maafi maang li, kisi ko maaf kar diya’. Thus, you
attain your own peace.

Aim. I have been asked to cover “Lessons on UN Peacekeep-
ing Operations - The Indian Experience”.

Preview. It would be presumptuous on my part to recog-
nize that India can or for that matter, anybody can go alone
in peacekeeping. It is a collective effort of dedicated, selfless
and spirited team of Civilians, Police and Military (which in-
cludes the Army, Aviation and Naval elements) who respond
to a higher calling for peace. I shall cover the subject in three
parts:-

Part-I. The British Indian Army pre-independence.
Part-II. Some challenging missions undertaken by peace-
keepers from India to serve the cause of Peace.
Part-III. Issues that need greater examination and consoli-
dation at the strategic and operational levels.

Part I : British Indian Army Pre-Independence

In April 1895, the Army in the Presidencies of Beng-
al, Bombay and Madras were unified into a single Indian
Army. For administrative convenience, it was divided into
four commands namely Punjab (including North West fron-
tier), Bengal, Madras (including Burma) and Bombay (in-
cluding Sind, Quetta and Aden).

Undoubtedly, the British Indian Army was a critical
force for the primacy of the Empire, both in the Indian sub-
continent and across the world. Besides being responsible
for Internal Security Duties the Army fought in many the-
atres - Anglo Burmese wars, First and Second Anglo - Sikh
wars, First, Second and Third Anglo - Afghan wars, First and
Second Opium wars in China and in Abyssinia.

In WW I (1914-1918), 1.3 million soldiers served in
different theatres with 74,187 troops killed in action. 69 Of-
ficers were commissioned between 1918 and 1932. In 1932
the Indian Military Academy was established at Dehradun.

In WW II (1939-1945), Indian soldiers fought for
the allies in Burma, SE Asia, Middle East, Africa and Europe.
Some 87,000 personnel were killed in action.

Upon Independence and the partition of India, four
of the ten Gurkha Regiments were transferred to the Brit-
ish Army. The rest of the British Indian Army was divided
between the newly created nations of India and Pakistan.
What does this tell us - both sides inherited leaders, Mili-
tary capabilities and capacities with vast exposure to com-
bat, other armies, different cultures, operating in support of
civilian administration by way of management of Refugees,
IDPs, Mob and Riot Control, humanitarian support and re-
spect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
Part II: India’s Contributions to UN Peacekeeping (UNPK)

India was a founder member of the UN. Ever since 1948 when Mr KPS Menon Chaired a UN constituted nine member commission on Korea to mediate between the two Koreas and then on 29 July 1950 when India announced that it would dispatch a Field Ambulance and a Surgical Team to Korea for Peacekeeping, India’s response and unreserved participation has been strong, resilient, qualitative, spontaneous and enthusiastic.

As of date India has a UNPK experience of 63 years with participation in 46 missions out of 67 with over 1,76,000 troops (Military and Police). We are the third largest troop contributor at present with 6,900 troops and overall first. India created history in UNPKO with the induction of an all women Formed Police Unit (FPU) in Liberia in 2007, which is still being sustained. At the senior leadership levels, India has provided 16 Force Commanders, 6 Deputy Force Commanders, 2 Divisional Commanders, 2 Police Advisers and 2 Military Advisors who had served with two different UN Secretary Generals, as also civilian leadership. 154 Peacekeepers from India have made the supreme sacrifice, underlining above all India’s commitment to the objectives set out in the UN Charter, which to my mind is a well-crafted document now signed by 193 member states.

Broad Guidelines Observed by India While Committing Peacekeepers

» Considered at the request of the UN.
» Adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and Peacekeeping.
» Consent of the host nation and major parties to the conflict.
» Mission under UN Command and Control with a clear mandate.
» Unit/Sub-unit cohesion to be maintained.
» Contingents to be operationally ready on de-induction i.e. no degradation in efficiency and readiness standards.

Speaking on the eve of the 22nd anniversary of the UN in 1967 late Dr Zakir Hussain then President of India said, “India’s participation in the UN must be encouraged, because there is no international machinery other than the UN which could further the common aims of mankind”.

Peacekeeping is one of the cornerstones of India’s foreign policy. India’s participation in UNPK as in the case of all other nations in UNPK is connected to the furtherance of her national security interests and also impelled by our stake in the political stability of East and SE Asia, India’s energy interests, the significant diasporas in the region, as well as historical connections and hence manifested in our participation by way of military contingents, UN Mil Observers (UNMOs), Staff Officers, Police and Civilians.

I shall now cover in brief India’s contributions to some robust missions from which we can derive important lessons.

Korea

» ‘For the honour of India’ was the motto chosen for India’s first UNPKO, the Custodian Force in Korea. In an inspired decision on 29 July 1950, India announced that it would dispatch a Field Ambulance with an attached Surgical Team to Korea as part of a coalition force. 60 Para Field Ambulance which had been formed in 1942 and had combat experience in Burma in World War II was earmarked for the mission. From the outset, the unit was deployed to operate as two separate entities with the main component assigned to 27 Commonwealth Brigade. There were numerous occasions when the unit operated as a combat unit rather than as an enabler as is only expected. On 23 March 1953, a Surgical Unit under Lt Col Rangaraj was parachuted into Munsan as part of US 187 Airborne Regiment.

» By the time the unit returned to India in February 1954 it had done 2324 surgical operations, taken care of 1,95,000 outpatients, 20,000 inpatients and 5000 dental cases.

» In 1953 India provided a Custodian Force of 231 Officers, 203 Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and 5696 Other Ranks (ORs) for neutral nations repatriation commission to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indo-China deployed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam from 1954 to 1975.

UNEF I 1956-67. The employment of armed military contingents was first authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) with UNEF I in the Gaza strip and Sinai after the second Arab-Israeli War of 1956. From 15 November 1956 to 19 May 1967, 393 Officers, 409 JCO’s and 12,363 ORs served under the command of Maj Gen PS Gyani and then Maj Gen IS Rikhye (later appointed as the first Military Advisor (MI-LAD) to the UN Secretary General). This mission became a base model for future missions. Incidentally, late Maj Gen IS Rikhye and I belong to village Durmial in Jhelum District of Punjab.

ONUC 1960-63. Success of UNEF I led the UNSC to readily accept a request from the newly independent Republic of Congo in 1960, to intervene. The UN accepted responsibility for ending the Katanga secession movement and re-unifying the country. The Rules of Engagement (ROE), which conformed to the concept of Minimum Use of Force (UOF) only in self-defence, were modified to cater for UOF in defence of the mandate, in carrying out humanitarian tasks and in countering mercenaries employed by secessionists. Canberra bombers were employed in support of operations by peacekeepers. Contingents also undertook demining tasks. Peacekeepers provided excellent support in handling Refugees, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), ensuring child protection and protection of women, provision of humanitarian aid and shelter. 38 Indian Peacekeepers were killed in these operations.

South Lebanon 1998. In 2006 Indian Peacekeepers were deployed in South Lebanon (UNIFIL) as part of a 2000 size force. In the major flare-up lasting 40 days, in Jul-Aug 2006,
no post was vacated. Ironically the size of mission has since been increased six fold with tanks, APC’s, shoulder fired surface to air missiles, interception equipment, a Naval force with no major changes in the role and tasks of the mission. Further, the same mission has also witnessed induction of the Lebanese Army. All this happened more for political reasons and went against Military advice.

**UNOSOM II 1993-94.** In the period 1993-94, India and Pakistan provided the bulk of Peacekeepers in a Chapter VII mission. This mission operated under a vigorous mandate vis-à-vis UNOSOM I. Its major tasks included providing food aid to people in areas affected by famine, to deploy in all parts of Somalia, put an end to violence and factional fighting, monitor all factions with regard to cessation of all hostilities and seize and maintain control of all weapons. Other tasks allotted were:

- Ensure safe return of 300,000 refugees.
- Generate employment and help in re-building Somali society.
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).
- Conduct search operations (Indian light helicopters performed scout tasks for Pakistan attack helicopters).
- Humanitarian support tasks.
- Help build a Somalia civil society intelligence network.
- Energize judicial services as part of Peace Building tasks.

Following the tragic downing of US Attack Helicopters (Black Hawk) by rebels a large number of contingents started to pullout from the mission area. Contingents from India and Pakistan remained there until the very end and conducted a very deliberate de-induction operation.

**UNAMSIL 2000-2001.**

- This was the first ever Ch. VII mission with a Protection of Civilians (POC) Mandate. UN Forces took-over the peacekeeping tasks from ECOMOG Forces who were operating in Sierra Leone. Consequent to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) reneging on the peace agreement and imposing restrictions on the freedom of movement of 11 UNMOs and 250 Peacekeepers in May 2000, I was tasked to lead an Intervention Force to restore the situation.

- In a multinational operation (Op KHUKRI) launched by me as the Sector Commander lasting 48 hours, the freedom of movement of Peacekeepers was fully restored. We lost one Peacekeeper and 14 personnel were injured during the operation. Force was applied as necessary (Artillery Fire, APC’s Heavy Mortars and Attack Helicopters). There were no reports of violation of Human Rights, code of conduct and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Soon after my sector retrieved APC’s and other, major equipment earlier lost by some contingents to rebels from rebel held areas. The resistance of RUF was truly broken. All through this, IDP’s and Refugees were afforded full protection and relief. It pains me to say that going by the challenges robustly handled by peacekeepers between 1950 and 2000, the UN is still grappling with issues related to multi-dimensional peacekeeping. The need of the hour is to consolidate on extant peacekeeping issues through a concerted approach.

**UNDOF 2006.** India has similarly distinguished itself in this mission with strong leadership and boots on ground in the face of severe operational conditions prevailing in Syria since 2011.

Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK), New Delhi

The centre was established in Sept 2000 and is funded by the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Major activities conducted by the CUNPK are:

- National and International courses (Contingent Commanders, Staff Officers and UNMO’s). Some courses are now recognized by ITS, UN HQ.
- Exchange of Trainers with other international training centres.
- Seminars on peacekeeping issues.
- Training of all contingents and all Officers earmarked for UNPKO.
- Doctrines.
- Capsules conducted at DSSC Wellington, Army War College, Mhow etc.
- Training of diplomats (as requested), Police, Air Force and Naval personnel.

The centre has been acting as the secretariat for International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) since 2005. Pakistan has recently become a member of IAPTC, which is greatly welcome.

**PK Doctrine.** Formulated by service HQ: Tenets for training are:

- Given the multi-dimensional nature of PKO, it is axiomatic that participating troops should have achieved a high standard of training skills. Training for PKO is therefore a national responsibility.
- Training for PKO should be institutionalized both at the international and at the national levels so that persons from different TCC’s and PCC’s and groupings have a commonality of standards, concepts and procedures. In India, training has been institutionalized at the national level – CUNPK with effect from Sept 2000 similarly for IAF, IN, Police and Civilians. UN guidelines – CPTM and SGTM is a must teaching point as also guidelines on capability development, SG Bulletins etc.
- Maintain regular interaction with DPKO/DFS, DPET, ITS and other regional PKTC’s.

Training is institutionalized from pre – commission to post-commission levels for officers at different stages :

- Pre-deployment at New Delhi.
- In mission- lessons handed down.
- Re- orientation training on de-induction of a contingent.
- Training must reflect multi-dimensional and multi-discipline nature of contemporary PKO. Skill development, positive relationship, integration with other agencies and organizations.
- Adherence to code of conduct, IHL, gender and HR guidelines.
Training, preparation for PKO should in no way affect a unit’s combatworthiness and operational readiness to meet national exigencies. The training should not unduly alter a unit’s structure, mission or concept.

Time does not allow me to cover India’s experience in some other challenging missions such as in Cambodia (UNTAC 1992-93), MONUC 1999, Rwanda 1994-96, Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000-08, Sudan and South Sudan 2005-, Angola 1988-99 and Mozambique 1992-94.

Ladies and Gentleman I now move to Part III of my talk in which I would like to reflect on issues requiring the attention of the International Peacekeeping community with respect to UNPKO at the strategic and operational levels. Reorganization of DPKO and Creation of DFS. In 2007, DPKO was reorganized and the support, discipline and training functions placed under the newly created Department of Field Support (DFS). Thus, DPKO was left with operational functions and Administration Logistics, Training, Conduct and Discipline functions placed under the DFS. This separation in itself violates the principles of war, principles of management and what I call operating principles of peacekeeping, which to mention a few are:-

» Selection and Maintenance of Aim.
» Foresight and planning and speed of operations.
» Intelligence and Information.
» Flexibility of operations and speed of decision-making.
» Economy and unity of effort including coordination. (Administrative and Logistics Orders (Adm and Log O) to support operations and contingency plans in missions unlike now in peacekeeping where administration and logistics dictate peacekeeping operational plans. A mission support plan is not the same as Adm and Log O.
» Security of Plans.
» Leadership-Professionalism, Responsibility and Accountability.
» Coordination.

In Peacekeeping, a number of above stated principles are not factored into planning for mission at the Strategic and Operational levels leading to ‘mission creep’. Most Battalion, Brigade (Sector) and Higher HQs are far smaller than, available in the UN Missions and yet capably handle all issues which Peacekeepers face in a mission.

Equipment, transport, training, discipline, welfare and morale are command functions and this separation is detrimental to effective peacekeeping. It is time to revisit this separation of functions. This is very material to command oriented armies as in the case of India and Pakistan. Command and Control (C2)

For long this issue has been discussed in different fora. My questions are:

» Is it a Military issue?
» Is it a Military-Police issue?
» Is it a Civil–Military– Police issue?
» Is it a leadership issue? It is time to closely look at all leadership issues covering the Civilian, Military and Police leadership available at the strategic and operational levels based on quality, experience, ability to operate jointly, confidence in handling large missions and the ability to look one up and two down.

The UN is a political body in which peacekeeping has been employed as an effective tool in the pursuit of international peace and security. Despite a call for greater clarity in UNSC mandates most mandates remain more political in content with the military and UNPOL security component reduced to mere numbers and influenced by budgets. The tempo generated by the Council in peacekeeping is not sustained by the DPKO, DPA, DFS and General Assembly (GA) bodies as the TCCs and PCCs for reasons of antiquated processes in UN HQ and the capacities available with member states. The lack of civilian capacities is also a cause for concern.

Salient recommendations to redress the issues of C2 and conduct of operations are set down below:

UNSCR. There is a requirement for wider consultations with member states and a stronger need to evidence ‘political will’, which has been lacking in many a resolution and follow up.

SG’s Reports to the Council. The missions reports to the DPKO should reflect the strategic, political, economic, social, security and actual state of affairs in the mission area with respect to the mandate. In case of perceived sensitivities of the host nation, TCC’s and PCC’s the reports can be in two parts, general and classified.

Framework Documents. These must be issued in time at all levels with wide dissemination. This is an important part of C2. In addition, these should be regularly reviewed.

DPKO and DFS. Their plans should be supported by the budgetary committee to generate the desired capacities in time. Missions should have some freedom to use finances for unexpected requirements.

Senior Mission Leadership. The long-standing demand of SRSG’s to have a say in the selection of their senior team requires a fresh look.

Re-organization of DPKO and DFS as also Creation of IOT’s. The separation of Operational functions and the support, Budgetary, Training and Discipline functions may not be so pronounced at UN HQ. What requires a review is the impact at the operational and tactical levels. The functioning of IOTs under the Office of Operations requires a review. Is an IOT serving the purpose for which it was originally designed or is it an impediment to C2?

Professional Capacities of TCC’s/PCC’s. The recent mandating of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in MONUSCO is one of many decisions taken by the UNSC/DPKO/DFS without understanding the full potential of extant capacities in the mission. So was a decision taken for collaborative operations and training in support of the DRC forces taken without a closer understanding of the Chain of Command, capacities and capabilities. The M23 development testifies to this statement. Sanctioning of the FIB without a full understanding of the roles and tasks of the earlier sanctioned
contingents especially the already available reserves is a cause for concern. Is the DFS capable of supporting the FIB operations with no effect on the contingency plans of the forces in Eastern DRC? The proposal for an Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacity (ERDC) in the GA Report of 2005 requires revival.

**Enablers.** The C2 of enablers requires re-examination being a mission resource rather than a DFS resource.

**MILOBs.** Peacekeeping has to gravitate to using MILOBs as a mission resource rather than a military resource.

**Intelligence.** Operations at mission level are mostly tactical i.e. Patrols, Check Points, COB/TOB, establishing an OP/LP, crowd/riot control, convoy protection and support to CIMIC activities. Therefore, the undue emphasis on UAVs, interception equipment, Air photos must be approached with caution. The spread of civilian, military and UNPOL in mission area is unmatched and sufficient to generate tactical intelligence.

**Reimbursement.** Almost all TCC’s and PCC’s experience a delay in reimbursement for all the resources provided. There is a need to review the rates of payment and the time in which dues should be reimbursed to a TCC or PCC.

**Regional Approach.** India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh provide the bulk of professional contingents for UNPKO. It is felt that a sub-regional approach to policy, doctrinal, structural, operational and training issues should be considered. The gender policies also require a well-considered view.

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**Conclusion**

PKO’s since the 90’s in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Sudan and the DRC reinforce the belief that as and when new situations arise, the international community and the belligerents will keep turning to the UN for attempts at resolution of differences. Hence, operations for maintenance of international peace and security will recur and shall require renewed political support, military and police preparations and civilian capacities. The root cause for each conflict must be addressed quickly and attempts made to remedy them collectively.

PK offers a good platform for increased military-to-military, police-to-police and civil cooperation and understanding. UNSAS, ERDC and a regional approach involving training and capacity building offers an excellent area for cooperation and improved understanding.

India with its 63 years of experience in UNPKO, the experience gained in the Maldives and Sri Lanka (both out of area contingencies), the exposure to low level insurgencies in the Northeast, aid to civil authority, disaster relief is well poised for a greater role at the regional, and global levels, to fulfill its role in support of international peace and security as a responsible developing nation. We greatly respect and recognize the contributions of all TCC’s and PCC’s in our common endeavours and pursuit of peace. Thank you very much for your kind attention.
Problems of Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations

Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa (Retired)
Former Director UNDPKO

Nature of Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

Having started in 1948/49 as simple missions to observe and report on implementation of interstate ceasefires in the Middle East and South Asia, peacekeeping, over the decades, has grown into huge and complex undertakings in four continents. More often than not, the conflicts managed by UN peacekeeping today are intrastate and rarely interstate. Violent intrastate conflicts are accompanied by myriad political, social, economic, humanitarian, human rights, institutional, administrative and other human problems that seek addressing along with the security situation. That calls for expertise in various specialized fields to be deployed in the theatre of conflict simultaneously. Hence, most peacekeeping these days is multidimensional. This multidimensionality requires close and intimate coordination and collaboration amongst those various experts to work towards the achievement of common objectives. But, as human nature would have it, the existence of such variegated presence of individuals and organizations in a common geographical, psychological and notional space can result in unhealthy competition, turf battles and institutional conflicts, which create Problems in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations.

As if that was not complex enough, some UN peacekeeping operations have taken an even more intricate form of Hybrid Missions. In that, one or more other intergovernmental organizations join the UN in managing a situation of conflict, like AU joining the UN in UNAMID. Such additional dimensions further add to the Challenges that beset Multidimensional Operations.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is the topic on which I shall briefly speak this afternoon – Problems of Multidimensional Peacekeeping.

Theatre of Operations Environment

The first challenge faced by multidimensional peacekeeping lies in the stage and level of failure of the host state at the time of deployment of a peacekeeping operation. There may be one of the two extreme situations obtaining there, or anything in between those two extreme conditions. The two extreme conditions are:

- First, that the state is largely intact in its functions and most of its institutions are operative, but it is unable to deal with violent non-state forces, which mar its security or threaten its sovereignty and territorial integrity, like in the case of Sudan or the DRC. The first problem in such cases is that on the one hand state wants the help of international community to overcome its internecine conflict and provide humanitarian support but, on the other, it wants the international community to look the other way on the excesses of the government on its people, misuse of state institutions, usurpation of the country’s wealth, mal-governance and political malpractices etc. In such situations, the UN multidimensional mission finds itself walking a tight rope and unable to fully and effectively pursue the implementation of its mandate. Hence, you find that often such missions go on and on ad-infinitum, without ever achieving the full measure of their mandate. In such cases, the peacekeeping mission also faces coercion in various forms at the hands of the country’s government.

- In the second case, the state may have become virtually nonexistent, except in its geographical presence and its acceptance within the international system. It does not have the ability to exercise its writ over most of its territory and would have lost its monopoly over the use of lethal force. It has no capacity left to address the sufferings of its people and there may be no functioning legislature, executive and judiciary, nor most other security, administrative, political and social institutions. A pristine example of such a situation is Somalia of yester years. In such situations, the multidimensional peace operation’s first problem is to determine the start point and establish priorities – should it first address the security issues or should it first provide food and medical aid to famine stricken people. Can it provide food and medicines without an enabling security environment? Can it initially focus only on security and let the sick and hungry population perish? Is it possible to do both – security and humanitarian aid – together? Those and such would be the dilemmas to overcome in the second extreme scenario of a totally failed state.

As I said earlier, in most cases it would be a situation between these two extremes and the peacekeeping operation there would, accordingly, suffer from varying degrees of the problems of both.
Inadequacy of Resources

Resource shortage is a perpetual problem of most peacekeeping missions, particularly those mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter. These shortages exist in all types of material and human resources. Sometimes there is not enough administrative support staff while at others there are not enough political and civil affairs officers. In some missions the DMS is without any procurement specialists while in others there is no conduct and discipline officer. Somewhere there is shortage of human rights officers while elsewhere there are not enough specialists for institution building. All such deficiencies adversely affect the performance of the mission and its ability to attain its mandate. However, the most telling inadequacies lie in the security related resources – both military and police. In many cases, even the authorized strength of combat resources and force multipliers falls short of the genuine requirement for a swift stabilization of the security environment and continued maintenance of that situation. For example, expecting MONUSCO, with about 22,000 uniformed personnel, to deal with the vast number of non-state armed groups and rebels in and around a country as large as the DRC is expecting the impossible. On top of that, the authorized strength is hardly ever complete, not in Congo and not in most other missions. Such limitations of force are further accentuated by the absence of essential military hardware. Sometimes there is a shortage of transport helicopter while at others there are no attack helicopters. Some missions may be short of armoured personnel carriers while others may not have enough night vision devices. Of course, there are limitations and constraints on what and how much the TCCs, PCCs and donors can contribute. But, in reality, this resource crunch and tight purses ultimately cost the international community dearly because peacekeeping missions with inadequate resources are unable to achieve the full measure of success and simply go on and on much longer than initially anticipated and planned for. In fact, this longevity of certain missions also results in TCC, PCC and donor fatigue as the number of peacekeeping operations multiplies with new conflicts emerging while the old ones are still unresolved. This increasing number of missions also results in overstretch of DPKO’s capacity. Therefore, there is a need to think of creative and inventive methods to overcome this perpetual problem. I am certain that DPKO is continuously battling with this issue, but I do not think that we will see an end to it soon.

Problems Internal to the UN Mission and System

However, the challenges that plague multidimensional peacekeeping are not external. They reside within the mission and the UN system. Let us take a little deeper and dispassionate look at those:

Absence of Shared Vision

Often, the various components of a mission may look at the conflict situation and the suffering of the people through different lenses. The political and military components may focus on political dialogue and security with not enough attention to human suffering caused by the violence of conflict and the demise of local political, economic, social, judicial, security and administrative institutions. On the other hand, humanitarian, human rights, social sector and development organizations may wish to divert focus from security and political matters towards assistance for economically and socially vulnerable communities and deprived groups. This difference of approach and intellectual perceptions create a discord, right at the outset, in the vision of the mission components, which have to deploy, exist and work together in the same theatre. This disharmony affects planning for such a mission as different components strive to push their own points of view and seek to obtain more than necessary human, financial and material resources for their objectives at the cost of others as well as distort priorities. This parochial slant sometimes continues even after the deployment of the mission and injures the mission’s effectiveness. To overcome such difficulties, the UN came up with the idea of integrated missions and developed an Integrated Mission Planning Process. But, the application of that process still gets skewed when DPKO, DFS, DPA, DSS, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, WHO, FAO, UNIFEM and a host of other agencies find the opinion of others distasteful and consider their own as the most proper.

Problems of Integration

Despite all the good intentions behind the concept of ‘Integrated Mission’, genuine integration in multidimensional missions is still a far cry. Why? Just a list of the goals and tasks that an Integrated Multidimensional Peacekeeping Mission may be expected to achieve and perform will answer that question. The tasks are so diverse that integration of their processes and results and synchronization of the efforts of their champions becomes a daunting undertaking. Here is a possible, but not complete, list.

Help Establish Stability and Order

» Monitor Ceasefire/disengagement arrangements to ensure continued cessation of hostilities.
» Provide a visible security presence and ensure an enabling environment for the peace process to progress.
» Support law enforcement.
» Protect civilians.
» Conduct mine action.
» Provide good offices and mediation.

Help Restore Writ of the State and its Monopoly over the Use of Force

» Deter interference by spoilers.
» Support/manage DDR.
» Support re-establishment/extension of civil administration.
» Support Security Sector Reform.

Organize and Coordinate Humanitarian Assistance

» Provide Emergency relief (food, shelter, medical supplies, logistical support, etc.)
» Help plan and support long-term return and rehabilitation of displaced persons, refugees and other affected
» Assist in economic and social recovery and development.

Support Re-establishment of Rule of Law Structures
» Support police reform.
» Support judicial reform.
» Support reform of corrections institutions.
» Promote human rights standards.

Support Legitimate Political Institutions and Processes
» Provide good offices and mediation support.
» Support national dialogue and reconciliation.
» Support organization of elections.
» Support constitutional process.
» Support strengthening of political parties and civil society.

Build and Sustain Regional and International Consensus for the Peace Process
» Keep the international community informed through the UN Secretariat and UNSC.
» Help prevent detrimental interventions by regional spoilers.
» Assist and encourage regional players/organizations for a positive role in the peace process.
» Indeed, not every mission may be asked to undertake all the above stated tasks. But some will. However, even with half of these undertakings, the difficulties in coordination and cooperation among the vast number of actors from different departments, agencies and organizations are huge. Though, there has been an ongoing effort to streamline and enhance integration in peacekeeping missions for a decade now and structures like JMAC and JOC also created in the same vein, yet in practice much depends on how the mission and other elements like the Country Team are associated together and how the leadership perceives the relationship between different elements. Let us take these two factors one by one:

Mission Country Team Relationship
In most multidimensional peacekeeping operations deployed as Integrated Missions, the RC/HC, who heads the country team, is also given the additional hat of Deputy SRSG of the mission. In smaller missions, where the RC/HC is the only DSRSG, this works relatively smoothly. But in larger missions, where there is also a Principal DSRSG taking care of security, political and civil affairs, one sees a discernible psychological distance between the mission leadership and the RC/HC. That, obviously, tells on the coordination and cooperation of the country team with the peacekeepers and vice versa.

Attitudes of Leadership
This relationship is also influenced by the attitude of the mission and country team leadership. In some cases, an SRSG announces on arrival that he is the boss and every UN entity in the theatre must work for him or leave. Such behaviour not only makes that SRSG unpopular among the country team but also creates aversion towards the Peacekeeping mission that he/she leads. On the other hand is the totally hands off attitude, where an SRSG tells the RC/HC that he/she should simply go on doing his/her job and not bother him (the SRSG) as his role is to focus on political matters only. That too is unhealthy for good coordination and cooperation. A good approach is to establish a relationship of mutual trust and unified objective orientation amongst all elements of the integrated mission – political, military, civil affairs, humanitarian, human rights, developmental and administrative, etc. Similarly, many a times these relations are soured by the negative attitude of the HC. Some HCs are overly protective of the Humanitarian Space and take any humane assistance to any community by non-Humanitarian actors as a violation of that space. Like it or not, sometimes such an attitude on their part receives approbation from their superiors in OCHA and agencies. Such an approach is absolutely disastrous for maintaining integration, or even for simple and essential coordination.

Under Utilization of Integration Structures
For better integration and smooth management of integrated missions, new structures were established by the UN some years ago, like the IOTs at the HQ and JMAC and JOC in the field. JMAC and JOC were created to help collect, collate and analyse information of all kinds to develop a comprehensive picture of the obtaining situation at any time, disseminate that information to all concerned and then undertake necessary measures as fully coordinated actions. But, visiting and evaluating many missions, one found that JMAC and JOC had just become structure oriented solely towards military information and operations. At best, there was a very small accommodation for matters related to UN Police. In one case the RC/HC, who was a DSRSG, had no idea at all about the role and responsibilities of JMAC and JOC in that mission and had never visited those despite having been there for over a year.

Integrated UN System Standards
Similarly, to obtain better integration in the field, Integrated Mine Action Standards and Integrated DDR Standards have been established and published. However, regretfully, it is not uncommon to detect ignorance about those in the field missions, where many a times one finds people attempting to reinvent the wheel in these areas.

Mandate Ambiguity
However, much discussion has gone on over the years between the UNSC and the Secretariat on the need for the Council to give clear mandates to integrated peacekeeping missions. But, I guess, there will always remain much to be desired in that respect, for often the UNSC has to find compromises between differing positions of its members, particularly the P5; and sometimes has to assuage the concerns of the regional big wigs, accommodate the requirements of the TCCS/PCCs and respond to requests and needs of the host country.
Civil-Military Relations
In rare cases there may exist a rather fundamental problem that can seriously thwart the achievement of the Mission’s objectives. This is the lack of understanding between the SRSG and the FC. The reasons for it often lie in the personal and professional inadequacies of the SRSG or the FC, or both. But, the sooner they resolve their differences the better for the mission to move towards the attainment of its mandate. A similar but lesser problem that arises in some missions is the hostility between the mission support component and the military. The SRSG or his/her deputy must play a leadership role to resolve such differences.

Issues of External Coordination
Often, a theatre of operations with complex problems will have the presence of players from outside the UN system too. They could include international humanitarian organizations like the ICRC, humanitarian NGOs, human rights NGOs, international financial institutions, military and police presence under bilateral or regional arrangements, judicial experts, governance experts and, above all, international media. The diplomatic community, if there is still any in the host country, is another important element to be heedful of. Many of those external players may seem to have no concern for the objectives of the peacekeeping mission. Some may actually be hostile towards the working of the mission – not because they are against peace and stability in that place, but because they may be pursuing different interests and agendas and their focus of action may vary from that of the peacekeeping mission.

The presence of these external players and the need to develop some modicum of cooperation with them cannot be understated. If the mission leadership succeeds in developing an understanding of partnership with them, then many of them may be able to complement the mission’s efforts. However, in the case of some it may be important just to keep them from working at cross purposes to the efforts of the mission. Difficult as it may be, the peacekeeping mission must play a leadership role to resolve such differences. This is the lack of understanding between the SRSG and the FC. The reasons for it often lie in the personal and professional inadequacies of the SRSG or the FC, or both. But, the sooner they resolve their differences the better for the mission to move towards the attainment of its mandate. A similar but lesser problem that arises in some missions is the hostility between the mission support component and the military. The SRSG or his/her deputy must play a leadership role to resolve such differences. For example, the IFIs for economic recovery and development; IFIs again for infrastructure rehabilitation and DDR; Non UN military and police for maintaining peace and security as well as for Security Sector Reform; ICRC and NGOs for help in humanitarian assistance and promotion of human rights standards; the diplomatic community for enhancing the peace process and help in political dialogue; and, the media for sustaining regional and international consensus for the peace process; etc.

Conclusion
The problems mentioned above are just some of the more salient ones faced by multidimensional peacekeeping missions. There will be many more either common to most missions or specific to a given operation like differences in social and work cultures, uncommon vocabulary, absence of local resources, pressures from the capitals of TCCs and PCCs, etc. The fact is that managing a multidimensional mission, or a component thereof, is a task that requires astute leadership, character, understanding, professional excellence and extraordinary management skills. None of the problems that I have spoken of are insurmountable. However, all require cognizance to be resolved sooner rather than later if a mission is to progress towards the achievement of its mandate. However, it should not be for the mission leadership only to address these issues. The UN system must also continuously keep shoving away at institutional prejudices, encourage changes of attitude among managers, develop better interdepartmental knowledge and understandings, strengthen a culture of partnership rather than rivalry, place greater value on integration skills, harmonize procedures, address financing challenges, fully align the authority of the SRSG and DSRSG with their responsibilities, ensure a clear division of labour in the mission and continue to seek clearly spelt out mandates from the UNSC.

Such efforts within the UN system will make integration in the field easier and effective, which will help mission leadership in quick resolution of the problems faced by that mission. Promotion of more effective integration will help in more realistic and effective joint planning from the start until the end of a mission with all components adopting a common strategic approach. It will ensure synergy in the actions of all the elements deployed in a theatre of operation, bringing about a swifter achievement of the mandated objectives. In addition, system wide competences, expertise and assets will be utilised more efficiently and effectively. Finally, it will help in maintenance of international and regional support for the peace process. DPKO must stay in the lead in bringing together the UN system on these matters and in developing strategies to sell the benefits of integration and harmonization of effort to all players associated with multidimensional peacekeeping, within and outside the UN; and to create efficient tools and mechanisms to implement integration in the field.
VOTE OF THANKS

Maj Gen (R) Ali Baz,
Principal, NUST Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (NIPCONS)

Ladies and Gentlemen Assalam-o-Alaikum and Good Afternoon.

We had two days of wonderful scholarly activity during the Seminar on Peace and Conflict Resolution. In this context, thanks from NUST are due to all the guest speakers and moderators for their scholarly thoughts without whose contribution the success of this event would not have been possible:

Hence, I begin by complimenting all the eminent presenters, moderators and delegates who added value to this Seminar. In particular, I am thankful to the following speakers and moderators for sharing with the audience their expertise in various disciplines:-

- Mr Timo Pakkala, UN Resident Coordinator in Pakistan.
- Dr Edward Rhodes, Dr Sara Cobb and Dr Allison Fredak-Blume from the George Mason University, USA.
- Dr Saira Yamin of Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, USA.
- Mr Jonas Alberoth of Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden.
- Lt Gen R K Mehta (Retired) from United Service Institution of India.

I must also thank the participation of other delegates from the following institutions:-

- Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden.
- Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana.
- United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.
- Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Egypt.
- Birendra Peace Operations Training Centre, Nepal.
- Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre, Kuala Lumpur.

I also thank the following domestic speakers for their scholarly input that highlighted Pakistan’s peacekeeping efforts at the global level:-

- Mr Ahmer Bilal Soofi.
- Ambassador (R) Shahryar M. Khan.
- Lieutenant General (R) Tariq Waseem Ghazi.
- Lieutenant General (R) Sikander Afzal.
- Major General (R) Anis Ahmad Bajwa, and
- Brigadier (R) Mujahid Alam.

My thanks to Islamabad Police, CDA and other governmental agencies and organizations for their cooperation.

I would be remiss if I did not thank the organizers, members of the faculty and staff of CIPS and of our University for their untiring efforts in putting together the activities of this Seminar of international proportion.

Ladies and Gentlemen! The idea behind this congregation of scholars and experts was not only to engage in an informed academic discourse on the subjects of peace and conflict resolution, and peacekeeping, but also to show to the entire world that Pakistanis are a peace-loving nation.

Through an event of this scale, we also want to spread the word about the existence of Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS).

We look forward to initiate collaboration with academic institutions and peacekeeping training centres that have been part of this Seminar and those, which could not send their delegates due to various reasons.

Finally yet importantly, I thank everyone’s participation, especially the audience, for successful conduct of the Seminar.

Thank you very much once again. Wish you safe journey back home.
CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions are in the light of papers presented and discourse that took place during the Seminar. It was pointed out that, interstate conflicts should be resolved through the services of the UN and for the intrastate conflicts; narratives should be built which are more appealing to the populace. UNPKOs and conflict resolution are overlapping disciplines and academically complementary to each other. Particularly at the senior leadership level, the peacekeepers need to understand the mechanics of conflict resolution in order to ensure the success of their missions.

Regional Stability in South Asia

South Asian countries are highly important because of their significant contribution to UN peacekeeping missions. Peace and stability within South Asia is crucial because conflicts, both intra- and inter-state, can have negative impacts on UN peacekeeping missions. Therefore, there is a need to focus on peace and collaboration among the South Asian countries. In this regard, one of the panelists suggested that the economic cooperation among SAARC states would inspire other conflicting states to follow suit. Economic cooperation among SAARC members would protect the individual economies of SAARC states in the face of the rapid pace of globalization, maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of the process. A sustained multi-tier economic partnership across the SAARC region will help build trust and confidence between various states, for instance India and Pakistan. A South Asian economic union, where every member has an economic stake would motivate adversaries to resolve political differences or set them aside, and become partners in development.

Global Peace

The path to peace is through the evolution of radicalized narratives, which, when transformed, enable the emergence of new dynamics which in turn can provide the foundation for the creation of new solutions of serious problems. According to one learned panelist, a narrative framework for peacemaking includes a three-stage process of narrative mapping, intra-party dialogue and scenario building, leading to inter-party narrative mediation. Given that the problem is not just violence, or conflict, but radicalized narratives, these processes are designed to first increase our understanding and awareness of the nature of the stories in circulation, and then provide tools for their evolution.

As far as the role of the US in maintaining peace and stability is concerned, trust deficit between US and Pakistan impedes regional peace in South Asia. Pakistan and the US in the globalized world can take the advantage of the open window available today to learn more about each other, build an honest dialogue, and work together on the substantial common agenda of human development and international problem solving. There are opportunities for both countries to benefit by aiming at improving relations. The maintenance of peace requires collective efforts at global and regional levels, and big powers must show greater responsibility by divorcing power politics that is not only disturbing global peace but also diminishing the role of the UN. In this regard, it is important to understand that sustainable global peace cannot be maintained until the big five of the Security Council refrain from acting on their vested national agendas.

Peacekeeping

Participants of the conference gave insightful analysis and offered useful recommendations to improve UN peacekeeping and thereby world peace. They also figured out the challenges that peacekeepers face and extended suggestions to cope with them.

Since the times of Somalia and Rwanda, UNPKOs have matured to embrace new knowledge, best practices and technologies for facing future challenges. To embrace the change, TCCs and their peacekeeping training centres need to continuously refine their peacekeeping training skills and knowledge. The issue of integration within the UN Peacekeeping Missions needs added focus.

It was highlighted that peacekeeping was becoming increasingly complex with tasks such as the protection of civilians and the task of linking peacekeeping with peace-building. The absence of clear guidelines on some of these new tasks, as well as the lack of consensus among member states on the appropriate role of UN peacekeeping has hindered missions from accomplishing their mandates. Political peace processes are weak and have undermined in several mission settings i.e. Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), etc., which challenge the fundamental assumptions of the peacekeeping doctrine. In addition, peacekeeping missions are experiencing increased conditionalities and some cases have resulted in withdrawals. Missions are experiencing troubles in delivering effective transition because of the lack of post-settlement peace building solutions. Exit strategies are also badly affected by this problem.

In the Seminar, a thorough discussion of UN’s multidimensional peacekeeping was carried out. In the light of the discussion, speakers put forwarded the following recommendations:

a. threats to civilians must be considered at the earliest stages of planning and the Security Council should be fully briefed ahead of its deliberations on peacekeeping mandates;

b. the Security Council must clarify its expectations regarding the implementation of peacekeeping mandates for protecting civilians;

c. the role of peacekeeping missions as protection actors must be operationally defined to clarify the scope of missions and the roles of individual actors within missions;

d. the Council’s caveats for protection in peacekeeping mandates can provide the right balance for actions by peacekeeping missions, if they are used effectively;

e. peacekeeping operations cannot ‘protect everyone from everything’ and they need to manage expectations.
Another point that was emphasized in the Seminar was the role of senior leadership in the successful accomplishment of mission. The correct selection of the senior leadership and their training hugely matters. This can ensure smooth integration and functioning within the mission and lead to effective implementation of the mandate and a successful mission. Training is essential part of missions and it is necessary for the UN peacekeepers to be adequately funded to accomplish their task. Countries that have traditionally provided UN peacekeepers, like Pakistan, Ghana, India, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, should prepare fully trained peacekeepers (army, police, and judicial services) to fulfil their mandate. In addition, credible information lays the strong foundation for successful missions and smooth peacekeeping. The UN should have its own intelligence information in potentially volatile regions for independently assessing situations.
Appendix – A

BIOGRAPHIES OF SPEAKERS

Foreign Speakers

Mr Timo Pakkala, UN Resident Coordinator (RC)
Mr Timo Pakkala has been UN RC and UNDP Resident Representative (RR) in Pakistan since October 2010. He joined the Finnish Diplomatic service in 1988. He served as Attaché and Second Secretary in Helsinki, Madrid and Tehran. He joined the World Food Programme (WFP) in 1990 as Programme Officer in Maseru, Lesotho. He subsequently served as Programme Officer WFP, in Addis Ababa, Regional Adviser in Kampala, Programme Coordinator for Eastern Africa at WFP Headquarters in Rome and Deputy Country Director in Nairobi. In 2005, he was appointed UN RC and UNDP RR in Pyongyang, DPRK, and North Korea where he served until 2008. Mr Pakkala’s most recent assignment was with WFP as Deputy Regional Director for Southern, Eastern and Central Africa, based in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Dr Edward Rhodes, GMU, Washington DC
Edward Rhodes is Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. Rhodes’s research has explored American foreign and national security policy. A principal focus of his work has been on the intellectual and cultural forces shaping American involvement with the world. Rhodes’s publications include: Power and MADness: the Logic of Nuclear Coercion (1989), The Politics of Strategic Adjustment (1999), Presence, Prevention, and Persuasion (2004), Global Politics in a Changing World (2009), and Introducing Globalization (2013). From 2010 to 2013, Rhodes served as Dean of George Mason University’s School of Public Policy. Prior to joining George Mason University, Rhodes was a member of the faculty of Rutgers University, serving as founding Director of the Rutgers Center for Global Security and Democracy and as Dean of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. From 2007 to 2009, he was a visiting professor at Princeton University, and he has also held research appointments at Harvard, Stanford, and Cornell Universities. From 2003 to 2009, Rhodes served on the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. Rhodes received his A.B. from Harvard University and his MPA and Ph.D. degrees from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Dr Allison Frendak-Blume, GMU, Washington DC
Professor Frendak-Blume developed the fifth version of the conceptual model of peace operations, a domain capturing the functions, tasks, relationships, and organizations involved in these operations. She regularly consults with agencies such as NATO and the National Defense University as well as humanitarian organizations including Save the Children Federations in Sarajevo (1998), the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia (1999-2002), and the United States Institute of Peace (2000-2002 as a research assistant, and since 2004 as a program consultant). In addition to her teaching and research, she manages the monthly “Peace and Stability Operations Colloquium Series” with funding obtained through the Compton Foundation.

Dr Sara Cobb, GMU, Washington DC
Dr. Sara Cobb, (Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, Amherst) is the Drucie French Cumbie Chair at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) at George Mason University. She was from 2001-2009 the dean/director of ICAR (now S-CAR; now she teaches and conducts research on the relationship between narrative and violent conflict. She is also the Director of the Center for the Study of Narrative and Conflict Resolution at ICAR that provides a hub for scholarship on narrative approaches to conflict analysis and resolution. Formerly, she was the Director of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and has held positions at a variety of research institutions such as University of California, Santa Barbara, University of Connecticut. She has also consulted to and/or conducted training for a host of public and private organizations, including UN High Commission on Refugees, UNDP, La Caxia Bank, and Exxon, the American Bar Association, as well as a number of universities in Europe and Latin America. Dr. Cobb is widely published. Her new book, Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution (Oxford University Press) lays out the theoretical basis for a narrative lens on both conflict analysis and conflict resolution; this perspective presumes that conflict is a struggle over meaning, anchored in and by the stories we tell about violence, victimization and values. She has been a leader in the fields of negotiation and conflict resolution studies, conducting research on the practice of neutrality, as well as the production of “turning points” and “critical moments” in negotiation processes. Some of this research is based on case studies from her field research on Guatemala, Chile, Rwanda and the Netherlands. The blend of academic research, program development, and practice enables Dr. Cobb to develop research projects that can yield practical understanding and generate effective interventions.

Dr Saira Yamin, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Hawaii
Dr Saira Yamin is a conflict resolution scholar-practitioner. Currently, she is Associate Professor at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii where she teaches a wide range of subjects including Security Dynamics in South Asia; Conflict Prevention, Man-
Mr Jonas Alberoth

He is the Deputy Director-General of the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden. The Academy is a government agency, under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dedicated to improving the quality and effectiveness of international conflict management, with a particular focus on peace and crisis management operations. Mr. Alberoth has also served as Acting Director-General for more than three years. Mr. Alberoth has previously served with the United Nations, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish Armed Forces in various roles in e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, including as Representative of the Swedish EU Presidency in Pristina. He has extensive experience of political affairs, liaison, negotiations and multidimensional cooperation in peace and crisis management operations, and was on the development team for the first Swedish Armed Forces Rapid Reaction Unit and its Senior Liaison Officer. For several years he was an Educational Consultant with the Centre for Teaching and Learning at Lund University. He has thorough national and international crisis management and security policy training, e.g. the United Nations’ Senior Mission Leaders Course and the Swedish National Defence College’s Senior Executive Course. He is also a former President of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC). Mr. Alberoth is a member of the International Advisory Board of the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF, Germany), the Course Director of the EU Senior Mission Leaders Courses, and the Civilian Exercise Director of the International Viking Exercise Series.

Fiifi Edu-Afful

Fiifi Edu-Afful is a Research Fellow with the Conflict, Peace and Security Programme at Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR), Kofii Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Accra, Ghana.

Lieutenant General (Retd) R K Mehta, United Services Institution of India

Retired on 31 May 2007 as the Military Advisor in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations He was commissioned in the Parachute Regiment in June 1968. The officer has commanded a parachute Battalion, a Mountain Brigade and an Infantry Division. During the Army Service of 39 years, he has held important command, staff and instructional appointments in the Army War College. He is an alumnus of the Defence Services Staff College and the National Defence College. As Sector Commander in Sierra Leone, he successfully conducted Robust Peacekeeping Operations to include Op KHUKRI, which forces the RUF to come to the peace table. He has had the privilege of serving with two Secretary General’s of UN: H.E. Kofi Annan and H.E. Ban Ki-moon. As the Military Advisor, he made major contributions in formulating the Capstone and Discipline, Cooperation with AU, EU, NATO, SHIBRIG and others in streamlining Military Strategic Direction.

Speakers from Pakistan

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan

Ambassador (Retd) Shaharyar M. Khan’s career as a diplomat is well known. Pakistan’s ambassador to Jordan, the United Kingdom and France he reached the top of his profession as Foreign Secretary, a post he held for four years between 1990 and 1994 when he retired. He was then appointed UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Rwanda. He remained in Rwanda for two years overseeing the United Nations programme in the country. In his retirement, Shaharyar Khan has written a number of books, the Begums of Bhopal - a history of the princely state of Bhopal (IB Tauris) and The Shallow Graves of Rwanda (IB Tauris) which is an eyewitness account of his two-year stay in a country ravaged by genocide. Cricket - a Bridge of Peace was his third book (Oxford University Press). His most personal book has been the biography of his mother Princess Abida Sultaan-Memoirs of a Rebel Princess (Oxford University Press). This book has recently also been translated into Urdu.

Lt Gen Sikander Afzal (Retd)

Lieutenant General (Retired) Sikander Afzal joined Pakistan Army in 1972. He held numerous command, staff and instructional appointments, including command of two Infantry Divisions and a Corps in Pakistan Army. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College Quetta and National Defence College Islamabad. He also holds Masters in Defence and Strategic Studies from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. The General has served abroad in Germany, Somalia, Qatar and Liberia. He has also served in two UN missions, in Somalia as a contingent Commander and as Force Commander United Nations Mission in Liberia.

Lt Gen Tariq Waseem Ghazi (Retd)

During a military career spanning 38 years, Lt. Gen Tariq Waseem Ghazi (Retd.) has served on key operational, command, policy formulation, crisis management and leadership training appointments. He has trained with the Australian and Canadian military, and has led a multi-national United Nations Peacekeeping Mission. He was Commandant of the two top officers’ training institutions: the Staff College, Quetta and the National Defence College, Islamabad. Lt. Gen Ghazi (Retd.) was appointed Secretary of Defence and oversaw working of defence establishment in Pakistan, representing its interests nationally and internationally as
Co-Chair of several security dialogue processes. He has been Chairman of Civil Aviation Authority, Fauji Foundation, Defence Housing Authorities, PIA Investments and Chancellor of Foundation University, Islamabad. Presently, he serves on the Board of Sadiq Public School Bahawalpur, Punjab and Kidney Centre. A recipient of Sword of Honour, two international and fifteen service awards, he has been conferred Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military) by the President for meritorious services.

Maj Gen Anis Ahmed Bajwa (Retd)
Maj. Gen. Anis A. Bajwa, HI (M) joined the Pakistan Military Academy in 1965 and was commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery in 1966. He retired in 2003. In the Army he commanded an Infantry Division, was the Vice Chief of General Staff and finally the Chief of Staff to the Chief Executive of Pakistan. He also taught at the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul and Command and Staff College Quetta. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from the University of the Punjab and a Master’s in War Studies from the Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an Interpreter in Persian language. He is also a graduate of various Command and Staff and Defence Colleges in Pakistan and abroad. Maj. Gen. Bajwa was the Chief of Staff at UNOSOM II Force Headquarters in Somalia in 1993-94. In 2000, he was appointed the Chief Military Observer in Georgia, where he earned a formal commendation for his work from President Shevardnadze of Georgia, a medal in appreciation of his work from the Russian Federation and acclamation of the United Nations. He returned to Pakistan in 2002 and in mid-2003 he joined the UN at New York as DPKO’s first Director of Change Management, spearheading a process of reform in Peacekeeping. His most significant achievement, perhaps, was the development of Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). In 2005, the Secretary General appointed him as his Deputy Special Representative in Timor Leste. Later, back in New York, as the Director of Change Management he was actively involved in the realignment and reorganisation of DPKO in 2007, which resulted in the separation of OMS from DPKO as a new department – DFS – and the creation of other structures like OROLSI, DPET, IOTs and a COS common to DPKO and DFS. On reorganization, he became the first Director of Policy, Evaluation and Training. Later, he was also given the additional hat of Inspector General for Peacekeeping. He retired from the UN in 2009. Gen. Bajwa is the recipient of Hilal-e-Imtiaz (Military) and a number of other honours and awards.

Brigadier Mujahid Alam (Retd)
Brigadier (Retired) Mujahid Alam has extensive and varied experience of over 40 years at the international and national level with unique experience of working in United Nations, diplomatic, government and military jobs. After retiring from Pakistan Army in 1999, he joined the UN on full time basis. Brigadier Alam has extensive experience in conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political negotiations in post-conflict environments in international setting. He has worked at senior level in two UN peacekeeping operations in very diverse environments of Eastern Europe and Africa. Additionally, he has worked with three UN investigative commissions, which were mandated by the Security Council to undertake highly sensitive and important investigations in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. He was Director and Principal Political Affairs Officer with the UN peacekeeping mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) from 2003 to 2010, during which he worked as Chief of Staff, as Principal Advisor to SRSG, as Head of MONUC office in Rwanda and as Head of MONUC office in South Africa. He also worked as Senior Civil Affairs Officer and Senior Municipal Administrator with UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 1999 to 2003. Brigadier (Retd) Alam is presently working as Principal of Lawrence College, Murree which is the oldest public boarding school in Pakistan. He has a Master’s (MSc) degree in Defence Studies.

Mr. Ahmer Bilal Soofi
Mr. Ahmer Bilal Soofi is Pakistan’s former Law Minister. He is an LLM from the University of Cambridge UK. He is the Senior Partner of a well-reputed law firm ABS & Co having its office in Lahore and Islamabad. Mr. Soofi acted as an expert from Pakistan to provide country report that became part of the ICRC Customary Study on international humanitarian law. He has done extensive work for improving legislation in Pakistan relating to human rights and international humanitarian law. In this regard, Mr. Soofi and his team carried out a one volume comprehensive comparison of Pakistan’s entire legislation with the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols and the Rome Statute. He also supervised preparation of a ratification memo for the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) containing comparison of Pakistan’s domestic legislation with the provisions of the ICCPR that formed the basis to ratify the ICCPR by the Government. Likewise, the Government when ratiﬁying Convention against Torture (CAT) considered his work on CAT and its legislative comparison. More recently, he has advised the Government on the Child Rights Convention. He has also advised the Government on the legal aspects of the country report from Pakistan on UNSC Resolution 1540.
Appendix-B

PROGRAMME

DAY I, Wednesday, 23rd October 2013
Inaugural Session (CIPS Auditorium)

0945-1000 hours  Arrival of guests and registration
1000-1005 hours  Recitation from the Holy Qur’an
1005-1015 hours  Welcome remarks by Rector NUST
1015-1025 hours  Introduction to CIPS and the Seminar
1025-1035 hours  Remarks by the Guest of Honour
1035-1045 hours  Remarks by the Chief Guest
1045-1050 hours  Presentation of Mementos to Chief Guest and Guest of Honour
1050-1100 hours  Group Photo Session
1100-1130 hours  Tea

Morning Session  Theme: Regional Peace with Focus on South Asia
Session Moderator  Dr Allison Frendak-Blume, GMU, Washington DC

1145-1215 hours  Mr. Timo Pakkala, UN Resident Coordinator, Pakistan
   Topic: Contemporary Conflict Resolution by the United Nations
1215-1245 hours  Dr Edward Rhodes, George Mason University (GMU), Washington DC
   Topic: US Foreign Policy and its Effects on Regional Peace in South Asia
1245-1315 hours  Dr Saira Yamin, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Hawaii
   Topic: Regional Peace in South Asia through Economic and Security Alliances
1315-1335 hours  Q & A / Discussion
1335-1345 hours  Concluding remarks by the Moderator
1345-1445 hours  Lunch Break

Afternoon Session  Theme: Resolution of International Conflicts
Session Moderator  Mr. Jonas Alberoth, Folke Bernadotte Academy Sweden

1445-1515 hours  Dr Allison Frendak-Blume, GMU, Washington DC
   Topic: The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations in a Conflict Zone
1515-1545 hours  Mr. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, former law minister
   Topic: Reforms Required in International Law and International Humanitarian Law in Preventing Conflicts
1545-1615 hours  Dr Sara Cobb, GMU, Washington DC
   Topic: Innovative Ideas and Approaches in Resolving International Conflicts
1615-1635 hours  Q & A / Discussion
1635-1645 hours  Concluding remarks by the Moderator
1930 hours  Rector’s Dinner

DAY II, Thursday, 24th October 2013
Morning Session I  Theme: Peace-building and the United Nations
Session Moderator  Dr Sara Cobb, GMU, Washington DC

1000-1030 hours  Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal, retired Pakistan Army (UN Mentor)
   Topic: Challenges and Best Practices for UN Mission Leadership
1030-1100 hours  Mr Fiifi Edu-Afful, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana
   Topic: ECOWAS Experience
1100-1120 hours  Q & A / Discussion
1120-1130 hours  Concluding remarks by the Moderator
1130-1200 hours  Tea
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<td><strong>Morning Session II</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1200-1230 hours</td>
<td>Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan (Former SRSG Rwanda)</td>
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<td>Topic: The Experiences of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General: How to Prevent another Rwanda</td>
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<td>1230-1300 hours</td>
<td>Brig. Mujahid Alam, retired Pakistan Army (Former UNPKO Official)</td>
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<td>Topic: Why Peace has eluded Congo: The Experiences of UN Peacekeepers Since 1960</td>
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<td>1300-1320 hours</td>
<td>Q&amp;A/Discussion</td>
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<td>1320-1330 hours</td>
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<td>1330-1430 hours</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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<td><strong>Afternoon Session</strong></td>
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<td>1430-1500 hours</td>
<td>Lieutenant General R K Mehta, United Service Institution of India</td>
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<td>Topic: Lessons on Peacekeeping Operations — The Indian Experience</td>
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<td>1500-1530 hours</td>
<td>Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa, retired Pakistan Army (Former Director UNDPKO)</td>
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<td>Topic: Problems of Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations</td>
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<td>1530-1550 hours</td>
<td>Q &amp; A / Discussion</td>
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<td>1550-1600 hours</td>
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<td>1600-1630 hours</td>
<td>Vote of Thanks by the Rector</td>
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<td>1630-1700 hours</td>
<td>Tea and Departure of Guests</td>
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